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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay describes and contextualizes the ongoing efforts by the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) to reconcile two dramatically competing 
interests: the desire to extensively monitor the communications of its citizenry, 
and a burning ambition to further develop its banking and financial industries, 
its high tech innovation capabilities, and its overall share of the “knowledge 
economy.”  
Monitoring and censoring communications, especially via “one-to-many” 
social networking platforms, is viewed as essential for the prevention of mass 
anti-Party political activities ranging from peaceful civil disobedience to armed 
insurrection and for the protection of the reputations of individual Party leaders. 
Mobile Internet technologies make electronic surveillance easier, but effective 
monitoring harder, as keeping track of the content and importance of individual 
                                                                                                                       
 * Professor of Law, Pace Law School, Pace University. I have traveled extensively in 
mainland China and in Hong Kong, and spent the 2011–2012 academic year as a Fulbright 
Scholar at Tongji University Law School in Shanghai, China. While I can speak very 
rudimentary conversational Chinese, the information in this essay was obtained exclusively 
through English language sources. Some of the assertions are based on conversations I had 
with Chinese judges, lawyers, students and business people.  
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communications requires time and trustworthy judgment calls that cannot be 
automated or outsourced. 
While unbounded surveillance may be a useful tool for keeping control of 
political subdivisions, it can be very bad for business. Companies want to 
protect their trade secrets, and control access to their financial data and other 
proprietary information, and they want to engage in confidential 
communications. Businesses also want access to the same information and 
Internet resources as their competitors abroad. The people running China would 
like to attract and retain all manner of sophisticated business ventures, but 
simultaneously wish to spy extensively on these companies and on the people 
who run them. And the Internet access that is generally available is censored 
and ponderously slow due to the extensive monitoring and filtering technologies 
that are in place. 
The CPC probably can’t have it both ways. If secure communication 
channels are not consistently available to private sector businesses within 
China, enterprises that value or require confidentiality will limit their in-country 
transactions. Some foreign companies may avoid doing business there 
altogether. But permitting credibly unmonitored and unfiltered communications 
on a scale commensurate with the size of the business community in China will 
not be a step the CPC takes lightly. Monitoring and censoring communications, 
especially via “one-to-many” social networking platforms, is viewed as 
essential for the prevention of mass anti-Party political activities ranging from 
peaceful civil disobedience to armed insurrection; and to protect the reputations 
of individual Party leaders. 
II. PRIVACY LAW AND PRAXIS IN CHINA 
China is often externally perceived as a nation with an autocratic 
government that does not permit its citizens any realistic expectation of personal 
privacy. Yet just as Western conceptions of privacy differ across variables such 
as age, gender, social class, and other factors, there may be an even wider range 
of variation in China, given its long and complicated history, geographical 
range, enormous population, and substantial ethnic diversity.1 As of 2005 there 
were more than 200 laws or regulations in China that mentioned privacy in 
some form.2 At the level of written laws and regulations China’s approach to 
privacy is actually far more robust and somewhat less incoherent than that of 
the United States. There is no need to search the Chinese Constitution for 
textual privacy penumbras or emanations.3 This document, which took effect in 
                                                                                                                       
 1 Bonnie S. McDougall, Particulars and Universals: Studies on Chinese Privacy, in 
CHINESE CONCEPTS OF PRIVACY 3, 4 (Bonnie S. McDougall & Anders Hansson eds., 2002). 
 2 Cao Jingchun, Protecting the Right to Privacy in China, 36 VICTORIA U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 645, 646 (2005). 
 3 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases 
suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
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1982, explicitly establishes a right of personal dignity that prohibits insults, libel 
and defamation, a right to be free of unlawful searches or intrusion into the 
home, and a right of freedom and privacy with respect to personal 
correspondence.4 Of particular relevance to the topic of this essay is Article 40, 
which states:  
Freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China are protected by law. No organization or individual may, on 
any ground, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of citizens’ correspondence 
except in cases where, to meet the needs of state security or of investigation 
into criminal offences, public security or procuratorial organs are permitted to 
censor correspondence in accordance with procedures prescribed by law.5 
China’s General Civil Code (1986) also contains several provisions that 
relate to privacy concerns, including: 
Article 99. Citizens shall enjoy the right of personal name and shall be 
entitled to determine, use or change their personal names in accordance with 
relevant provisions. Interference with, usurpation of and false representation of 
personal names shall be prohibited. Legal persons, individual businesses and 
individual partnerships shall enjoy the right of name. Enterprises as legal 
persons, individual businesses and individual partnerships shall have the right 
to use and lawfully assign their own names.  
Article 100. Citizens shall enjoy the right of portrait. The use of a citizen’s 
portrait for profit without his consent shall be prohibited.  
Article 101. Citizens and legal persons shall enjoy the right of reputation. 
The personality of citizens shall be protected by law, and the use of insults, 
libel or other means to damage the reputation of citizens or legal persons shall 
be prohibited.  
Article 102. Citizens and legal persons shall enjoy the right of honor. It 
shall be prohibited to unlawfully divest citizens and legal persons of their 
honorary titles.6  
The importance of Article 101 protection of “reputation rights” in particular 
was emphasized by two judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court of China, 
one in 1993 and another in 1998,7 and is often invoked in business litigation.8 
                                                                                                                       
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create 
zones of privacy.” (citation omitted)). 
 4 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 38, 39 (1982) (China). 
 5 Id. art. 40. 
 6 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated 
by Order No. 37 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 12, 1986, effective 
Jan. 1, 1987) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/juris 
dictions/ase/china/PRC_Civ_Law_Gen_Prin.doc. 
 7 See Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues About the Trial 
of Cases Concerning the Right of Reputation (promulgated by Judicial Interpretation No. 26, 
July 14, 1998, effective Sept. 15, 1998) (Lawinfochina) (China), available at 
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But focusing on the words of the Chinese Constitution and of the General Civil 
Code does not well facilitate an understanding of how the Chinese legal system 
actually operates.9 In practice, “meet[ing] the needs of state security”10 results 
in a whole lot of infringement of freedom and privacy, and censorship. Article 
40, like much of the Chinese Constitution, is more aspirational than descriptive. 
The disconnect between enumerated constitutional rights and the lived reality of 
Chinese people is most powerfully illustrated by Article 35, which asserts that 
Chinese citizens “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of 
association, of procession and of demonstration.”11 In practice these freedoms 
are extremely circumscribed. Written laws and official practices unsubtly fetter 
these freedoms substantially. So do unofficial government practices and 
longstanding social norms. One Chinese literary scholar has noted that 
“peepholes and eavesdropping are common devices in traditional Chinese 
narrative.”12 Chinese citizens participate in a culture of peer observation and 
orchestrated scrutiny. 
A. China’s Government, Legal System, and Privacy Control 
The official structure of the Chinese government was established by the 
current (1982) Chinese Constitution.13 The National People’s Congress of the 
People’s Republic of China is the highest organ of state power.14 Its permanent 
body is the Politburo Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.15 
The National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee exercise the 
legislative powers of the state, and also powers that in the United States are 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6673 (discussing the Answers to 
Some Problems on the Trial of Cases Concerning the Right of Reputation judicial 
interpretation in 1993).  
 8 See, e.g., Stan Abrams, Beijing University Files Suit over Sex Scandal Allegations, 
CHINA HEARSAY (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.chinahearsay.com/beijing-university-files-suit-
over-sex-scandal-allegations/; Shaun Rein, In China, Reputation Rules, FORBES (Sept. 23, 
2009, 2:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/23/china-reputation-government-
leadership-managing-rein.html; Shanghai Court Hears Michael Jordan Suit, CHINA DAILY, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-04/28/content_16458116.htm (last updated 
Apr. 28, 2013). 
 9 See Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in 
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164, 181 
(Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). 
 10 XIANFA art. 40 (1982) (China). 
 11 Id. art. 35.  
 12 Cathy Silber, Privacy in Dream of the Red Chamber, in CHINESE CONCEPTS OF 
PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 55, 56. 
 13 See The World Factbook: China,  CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2013). 
 14 See Melanie Hart, China Selects Its 7 New Leaders, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/china/news/2012/11/16/45166/chi 
na-selects-its-7-new-leaders/. 
 15 Id. 
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prerogatives of our executive and judicial branches of government. The 
Standing Committee is comprised of seven members, one of whom is 
designated the Communist Party Chief.16 As of October 2013, that role is filled 
by Xi Jinping, who replaced Hu Jintao, and who also succeeded Hu Jintao as 
President of China in March of 2013.17 Like previous top Chinese government 
executives, Xi Jinping is the public face of China and holds tremendous power. 
The other high-profile Chinese leader in China, subordinate only to the Party 
Chief/President, is the Premier of the State Council.18 This office is currently 
held by the former Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who replaced Wen Jiabao in 
March 2013.19 Though none of these four immensely powerful men ever stood 
for popular election, their status and authority derive in part from their name 
recognition and reputations among the Chinese citizenry. Just as American 
politicians will sometimes assert that criticism of them is “bad for the country,” 
Chinese leaders frame criticism of themselves as potentially destabilizing 
attacks on the CPC. Unlike American politicians, Chinese leaders can actively 
control what is said about them with imperfect, but still meaningful, 
effectiveness. 
Informally, the communicative restrictions under which Chinese people live 
their lives are openly acknowledged by people within the CPC hierarchy, often 
with the explanation that “China just has too many people” to make broader 
expressive freedoms a realistic possibility. The mechanisms of control are many 
and are deployed top down, bottom up and horizontally.20 Top down 
communicative control is mandated by the central government, which sets 
policy but delegates most of the mechanics of the actual control infrastructure to 
the CPC-affiliated leadership of the provincial governments, with the oversight 
of the national CPC hierarchy. Bottom up and horizontal control comes from 
ordinary people looking to maintain or improve their economic and social status 
by engaging in active surveillance of those around them, as part of their jobs, or 
on a volunteer basis.  
One of the most startling moments of the first class I taught in China came 
when several students introduced themselves as my “course monitors.” These 
were voluntary positions that brought them some small measure of recognition 
and prestige within the University and possibly within the CPC. My course 
monitors were always there to help me; willing to make photocopies; insure that 
I always had tea, chalk and an eraser; distribute Powerpoint slides; and make 
                                                                                                                       
 16 Id.  
 17 Id.  
 18 Id.  
 19 Id.  
 20 See generally Max Fisher, Chinese Government Officials Are Constantly 
Wiretapping and Spying on One Another, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2013, http://www.washing 
tonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/02/19/chinese-government-officials-are-constantly-
wiretapping-and-spying-on-one-another/; Frank Langfitt, In China, Beware: A Camera May 
Be Watching You, NPR (Jan. 29, 2013, 3:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/29/170469 
038/in-china-beware-a-camera-may-be-watching-you.  
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sure I knew when the Chinese holidays were. They also recorded and took 
copious notes of my lectures for reasons both related and unrelated to the final 
examination. I also always had Chinese faculty members sitting in on my 
classes, for which they received teaching credit. My Fulbright orientation taught 
me to expect this because the CPC is very suspicious of foreigners, especially 
those employed by the U.S. State Department as I was.21  
Law schools are particularly sensitive about outside influences. The CPC 
has far less sway over industry and commerce than it used to. Two places where 
the Party still retains powerful control are China’s public universities and 
China’s legal system. Chinese law schools sit at the intersection of both, so they 
are institutions where Party loyalty is particularly emphatically fostered and 
policed. At Tongji University Law School, students are required to take a 
political indoctrination class to learn about the genius of Deng Xiaoping and his 
“Reform and Opening” innovations, which led to the current economic system 
of “Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics.” Atypically for courses at Tongji, 
attendance was taken at every class meeting. 
Chinese academics are also scrutinized. The English-language press has 
reported that Chinese faculty members are counseled not to lecture about or 
discuss “the seven unmentionables” in their classrooms; the forbidden topics 
include universal values, freedom of the press, civil society, human rights, the 
Communist Party’s historical errors, the rich elite, and judicial independence.22 
And their lectures are monitored. According to a recent NPR report: 
                                                                                                                       
 21 For a fascinating account of university teaching in China, see generally AMY 
WERBEL, LESSONS FROM CHINA: AMERICA IN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE WORLD’S 
MOST IMPORTANT RISING GENERATION (2013).  
 22 Willy Lam, China’s Reform Hands Fail To Clap, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-240513.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2013) 
(“Xi, who is also president and commander-in-chief, indicated soon after taking power at the 
18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress last November that party authorities will do 
whatever it takes to firm up the people’s ‘self-confidence in the road’ (daolu zixin) of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. There was no bigger threat to the CCP’s status as 
China’s ‘perennial ruling party’ than a ‘calcium deficiency of the spirit’ among certain party 
members. It is therefore not surprising that commissars in CCP units, including the 
Propaganda Department, are pushing through draconian measures to prevent Chinese 
intellectuals, especially college students, from going down what Xi called ‘the deviant path’ 
of Westernization. In an unpublished internal party document entitled ‘Concerning the 
Situation in the Ideological Sphere,’ the CCP General Office called upon departments 
handling education, ideology and the media to tackle ‘seven serious problems in the 
ideological sphere that merit attention’. The circular added that these problems reflected ‘the 
sharpness and complexity of struggle in the ideological sphere’. What these challenges are is 
revealed by the fact that the document asked teaching staff in universities nationwide to steer 
clear of ‘seven unmentionable topics’ (qige buyaojiang): universal values; press freedom; 
the civil society; citizens’ rights; the party’s historical aberrations; the ‘privileged capitalistic 
class’ (quangui zichan jieji); and independence of the judiciary.”); see also Barbara Demick, 
China’s Xi More Maoist than Reformer Thus Far, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/08/world/la-fg-china-xi-20130608/2; Xi Jinping and His 
Take on the Seven Deadly Sins, STIRRING TROUBLE INTERNATIONALLY (May 30, 2013, 12:03 
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Last year, Beijing’s China University of Politics and Law installed 
cameras in classrooms. Officials said it was to prevent cheating, but professors 
didn’t believe them. Liu Xin, who teaches administrative law, thinks the school 
plans to target teachers who might criticize China’s current system in front of 
students. “Because things are recorded, once they suspect certain teachers are 
problematic . . . they can find the recordings and that means they’ve found 
evidence,” Liu says. She says cameras will intimidate instructors from 
speaking their minds and undermine learning. Liu thinks professors will just 
teach from textbooks to protect themselves.23 
Citizens who feel that they have suffered privacy violations that were 
inflicted by other citizens can appeal to the Chinese legal system. However, 
there is little realistic probability of successful redress for privacy incursions 
inflicted by government entities. Only if a particular government official was 
found to have been acting illegally on a fairly significant scale would a citizen 
alleging privacy violations have an opportunity to air these grievances publicly, 
and the remedy would most likely be a public apology and possibly the censure 
of any official the Party concluded had acted corruptly.24 
The judicial system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is described in 
Articles 123–35 of the Chinese Constitution.25 From the top level of the power 
hierarchy down, the Chinese court system is comprised of the following: the 
Supreme People’s Court, the Higher People’s Courts, the Intermediate People’s 
Courts, and the Basic People’s Courts.26  
Litigants are generally limited to one appeal, on the theory of finality of 
judgment by two trials. Cases of second instances are often reviewed de novo 
as to both law and facts. Requests for appellate review take the form of appeals 
and protests (in criminal cases). Appeals are lodged by parties to the case, 
defendants and private prosecutors.27  
                                                                                                                       
AM), http://www.stirringtroubleinternationally.com/2013/05/30/xi-jinping-and-the-seven-
unmentionables-or-deadly-sins-to-avoid/ (“Comrade Xi has told the Party faithful that there 
are seven unmentionables, seven ‘deadly sins’ that they should be very careful to avoid at all 
cost. The seven are: universal values; freedom of the press; civil society; human rights; the 
Party historical errors; the rich elite; and the independence of the judiciary. In case you are 
confused, these ‘deadly sins’ are all non-communist values. So what Comrade Xi is getting 
at really is that the greatest danger to communist rule is not a foreign intervention but the 
insidious penetration of foreign ideas and values.”). 
 23 Langfitt, supra note 20. 
 24 This was learned by talking to attorneys in China. 
 25 XIANFA arts. 123–35 (1982) (China); see also A Brief Introduction to China, 
LAWINFOCHINA.COM (May 31, 2010), http://www.lawinfochina.com/Legal/index.shtm. 
 26 A Brief Introduction to China, supra note 25. 
 27 Id. 
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Chinese courts function more as dispute resolution mechanisms than like 
Western style courts,28 and usually do not issue substantively explanatory 
decisions, just rulings which state who wins, but not why.29 It is hard to obtain 
dependable information about how much litigation concerning privacy issues 
has occurred in China. There isn’t a comprehensive central repository of court 
decisions, and even when rendered the decisions are not public documents and 
usually are only released to the parties in the case.30 When court decisions are 
lengthy, detailed and more widely released, it is usually in furtherance of a 
specific political agenda.31 So called “guiding cases” are intended to influence 
other judges’ interpretations of particular laws, but they tend to be few and far 
between. In the active area of intellectual property law, which is comprised of 
patent law, trademark law, copyright law and sometimes trade secret law, 
usually only a proportionately small number of guiding cases are released each 
year,32 and if the prevailing views of the CPC change on an issue, the guiding 
cases can be withdrawn without notice or explanation. Even basic information 
like the number of decided cases by subject area, or by geographic region, is not 
readily available.33  
Economist Paul Krugman recently said of China: 
All economic data are best viewed as a peculiarly boring genre of science 
fiction, but Chinese data are even more fictional than most. Add a secretive 
government, a controlled press, and the sheer size of the country, and it’s 
harder to figure out what’s really happening in China than it is in any other 
major economy.34  
Secrecy is also a hallmark of the Chinese judicial system. There is very 
little transparency in the operation of the courts, and little to no judicial 
                                                                                                                       
 28 RACHEL E. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN CHINA: A STUDY IN POLITICAL 
AMBIVALENCE 44 (2013). 
 29 See id. at 124. 
 30 Id. at 11. 
 31 Cf. id. at 131. 
 32 See Supreme People’s Court, Annual Report on Intellectual Property Cases (2012) 
(Abstract), CHINA L. & PRAC., Jul/Aug 2013, at 31; Supreme People’s Court, Annual Report 
on Intellectual Property Cases (2011) (Abstract), CHINA L. & PRAC., June 2012, at 14; see 
also Judith Romero, China Guiding Cases Project Publishes Four New “Guiding Cases” 
Released by China’s Supreme People’s Court, SLS NEWS (May 3, 2012), 
http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/newsfeed/2012/05/03/china-guiding-cases-project-publishes-
four-new-%E2%80%9Cguiding-cases%E2%80%9D-released-by-chinas-supreme-peoples-
court/; Steven Tung, As Chinese Courts Announce “Guiding Cases,” Stanford Law School 
Helps To Spread the Word, STAN. NEWS (Feb. 6, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/ 
2012/february/china-guiding-cases-020612.html; Laney Zhang, China: Supreme People’s 
Court Releases New Guiding Cases, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/serv 
let/lloc_news?disp3_l205403371_text (last updated Oct. 17, 2012). 
 33 STERN, supra note 28, at 10–11.  
 34 Paul Krugman, Hitting China’s Wall, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/07/19/opinion/krugman-hitting-chinas-wall.html. 
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independence. Verdicts are almost always issued without supporting written 
opinions that are publically available, if they exist at all. As one observer 
recounted: 
It is important to note that, by design, China does not technically have an 
independent judiciary or a legal system that operates outside the influence of 
the ruling Chinese Communist Party. This is an important distinction between 
China and Western democracies in which the court system is a critical 
component of the checks and balances placed on the other branches of 
government. In fact, China’s lack of an independent judicial system 
exacerbates all the other fault lines running through the totalitarian state: there 
simply is no effective recourse available to individuals whose interests are 
harmed by the excesses of CCP officials, laws, and institutions. Think of the 
scope and scale of what is addressed in the United States everyday through 
civil and criminal litigation—redress from unfair laws and business practices, 
compensation for injury, fraud, and lax environmental regulation, assignment 
of liability, justice for victims of public and private malfeasance, marital and 
custody disputes, protection of private physical and intellectual property. Some 
would argue ours is an overly litigious society. However, the average 
individual seeking a forum in which to officially air grievances and pursue 
some form of justice in China has a difficult time. 
Most importantly, [China’s legal] system lacks neutrality. The CCP 
approves all court appointments, and judges are technically responsible to the 
Party, not to the people. From the Basic, Intermediate, Higher Level People’s 
Court, and Supreme People’s Court, the CCP hand is evident. The CCP’s 
Political and Legal Committee has the power to intervene in deliberations, and 
even to overturn verdicts issued. In addition, the infrastructure lacks capacity; 
for example, there is one lawyer per 10,000 people in China (the United States 
ratio is one lawyer per 550 people). And finally, in many Western 
democracies, the ultimate arbiter of a law’s constitutionality is the court 
system. In China, this function becomes muddled and the CCP apparatus often 
rules on the interpretation of its own laws.35 
While some scholars argue that the Chinese legal system is developing in 
positive directions, others perceive what one describes as a turn against law that 
de-emphasizes the role of formal law and court adjudication in “a top-down 
authoritarian response motivated by social stability concerns.”36 Privacy 
provided by the Chinese legal infrastructure against the CPC is nonexistent. 
Like the United States, China lacks a comprehensive personal information law, 
but unlike in the United States there are no effective checks on governmental 
executive powers, or avenues of appeal to an independent judiciary,37 or any 
                                                                                                                       
 35 Modern China: The Promise and Challenge of an Emerging Superpower, WORLD 
SAVVY MONITOR, June 2008, at 55, 55–56, available at http://worldsavvy.org/monitor/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=113&Itemid=176. 
 36 Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 936 (2011).  
 37 See generally DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 198–218 (2d ed. 2009). 
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ability to leverage investigative reporting in the national media. Given the 
perception of China as a place bereft of private communications options, the 
absence of a privacy legal regime is significant to foreign and domestic business 
interests.38 The CPC understands this, and has been struggling to respond for 
years in a way that reassures those involved in commerce without emboldening 
those interested in political activism.  
B. Consumers and Commercial Tracking 
The Chinese Internet is by many accounts a giant shopping mall, much like 
what Westerners experience when they go online.39 The Internet is used most 
by China’s economic and educational elites;40 there is a strong geographical 
correlation with Internet usage as well.41 As in any wealthy nation, business 
entities in China like to collect information about online consumers.42  
Privacy conflicts between private entities and private citizens are somewhat 
less problematic to the CPC than privacy issues between individuals and the 
CPC, at least in theory. The Chinese government has responded to concerns that 
emerging business practices related to advertising and marketing threaten the 
privacy of individuals43 by issuing a startlingly large number of similar 
guidelines and regulations, and also proposing a few new laws.  
 A draft Personal Information Protection Law was published in late 2006, 
but never enacted.44 Article 2 of the Tort Law of the People’s Republic of 
China put into effect in 2012 references privacy generally, stating: 
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject to the tort 
liability according to this Law. “Civil rights and interests” used in this Law 
                                                                                                                       
 38 Cf. Freaking Out: Is Private Enterprise Under Attack?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21586293-private-enterprise-under-attack-freaking-
out (discussing China’s recent crackdown on corruption in businesses, despite official 
statements that China will press for more business-friendly reforms). 
 39 Gang Lu, [Infographic] China’s Internet Is a Giant Shopping Mall, TECHNODE (Feb. 
28, 2013), http://technode.com/2013/02/28/infographic-chinas-internet-is-a-giant-shopping-
mall/. 
 40 See David Wertime, Translation: Why China Has Two Internets, Not One, and What 
To Do About It, TEA LEAF NATION (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/08/ 
translation-why-china-has-two-internets-not-one-and-what-to-do-about-it/. 
 41 See Eli Bildner, A Map of Two Chinas—Internet Penetration and Economic 
Development, TEA LEAF NATION (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/01/a-
map-of-two-chinas-internet-penetration-and-economic-development/. 
 42 See Wang Yijun, Who Steals My Personal Information?, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE 
(Mar. 30, 2012, 3:04 PM), http://english.people.com.cn/90882/7774703.html. 
 43 See HAO WANG, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN CHINA: A RESEARCH ON CHINA’S PRIVACY 
STANDARDS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE 
INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION LEGISLATION IN MODERN CHINA 23–24 (2011). 
 44 Gastón Fernández, China Publishes Draft Privacy Guidelines, HOGAN LOVELLS 
CHRON. DATA PROTECTION (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.hldataprotection.com/2011/04/arti 
cles/international-eu-privacy/china-publishes-draft-privacy-guidelines/. 
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shall include the right to life, the right to health, the right to name, the right to 
reputation, the right to honor, right to self image, right of privacy, marital 
autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct, security interest, copyright, 
patent right, exclusive right to use a trademark, right to discovery, equities, 
right of succession, and other personal and property rights and interests.45 
In January of 2011, draft guidelines entitled “Information Security 
Technology—Guidelines for Personal Information Protection” were issued 
jointly by the General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and 
Quarantine, and the Standardization Administration, after being developed in 
consultation with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the 
PRC agency that regulates telecommunications.46 An amended version of the 
Guidelines was put into effect in 2013.47 The Guidelines only apply to 
computer networks.48 The Guidelines require that personal information be 
processed only for specific and reasonable purposes and that owners be notified 
of the purpose and scope of use before their personal information is processed.49 
Entities are required to ensure that the personal information collected is accurate 
and is adequately protected to prevent unauthorized access, release, destruction 
or alteration.50 The Guidelines prohibit illegal, disguised or indirect collection 
of personal information.51 
The Guidelines further prohibit collecting personal information from 
juveniles below the age of sixteen52 or collecting any personal information 
irrelevant to the defined purposes, especially with respect to race, religion, 
genetic background, fingerprints, health status or sexual activities.53 Owners 
have the right to request that managers keep their personal information 
confidential, and to disclose how the information was obtained, processed or 
disclosed. Owners also have the right to demand that any false information be 
corrected.54  
                                                                                                                       
 45 Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China, PROCEDURALLAW.CN (Jan. 10, 2010), 
http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/201001/t20100110_300173.html (last visited Oct. 
21, 2013) (providing an English translation). 
 46 Graham Greenleaf & George Yijun Tian, China Expands Data Protection Through 
2013 Guidelines: A “Third Line” for Personal Information Protection, with a Translation of 
the Guidelines, 122 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 1, 1, 4 (2013). 
 47 Id. at 2. 
 48 Id. at 7. 
 49 Id. at 14. 
 50 Id. at 5. 
 51 Id. at 4–5. 
 52 Greenleaf & Tian, supra note 46, at 16. 
 53 See id. at 9. 
 54 See id. at 3–5. See generally Hunton & Williams LLP, China: Draft of Personal 
Information Protection Guidelines Issued for Comment, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG 
(Feb. 2011), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/uploads/file/china_draft_of_personal_info_ 
protection_guidelines_issued_for_comment.pdf.  
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On December 28, 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress passed the Resolution of the Standing Committee of the NPC Relating 
to Strengthening the Protection of Information on the Internet.55 These 
Regulations proclaim that “the State will protect electronic information that can 
identify individuals and implicate their private affairs, and [that] no 
organization or individual may misappropriate or otherwise obtain electronic 
personal information by unlawful means, or sell or otherwise unlawfully 
provide it to other persons.”56 The Regulations set forth requirements directed 
at Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other businesses that handle electronic 
personal information:57  
ISPs, public service units (PSUs) and other companies that intend to 
collect and use personal digital information: 
• Must make their policies for collection and use public 
• Must explicitly state the purposes, means, and scope of the collection 
• Must obtain the consent of the all [sic] of the subjects of the data 
collection 
• Must not violate relevant laws and regulations 
• Must not violate any agreements or contracts with the subjects of the 
data collection.58 
The scope of the Regulations is limited to electronic personal information 
and, for the most part, only Internet-related processing.59 Still, it seems to 
suggest CPC recognition that people care about online privacy and want the 
government to regulate how private entities interact with them and their 
personal data. How these Regulations will be enforced is an open question, but 
their passage signals that the CPC believes the issue is important to the Chinese 
citizenry, and something that the Chinese people expect their government to 
concern itself with.  
In April 2013, the People’s Republic of China’s General Office of the 
National People’s Congress published a draft amendment to the Law on the 
Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests (enacted in 1994) and solicited 
public comments on the amendment.60 The existing Law on the Protection of 
                                                                                                                       
 55 Hunton & Williams LLP, Chinese Legislature Passes Data Privacy Resolution, 
PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Data Privacy Resolution], 
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2013/01/articles/chinese-legislature-passes-data-priva 
cy-resolution/. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Samon Sun & Jared Nelson, China: Decision on Strengthening the Protection of 
Online Information, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.natlawreview.com/article 
/china-decision-strengthening-protection-online-information. 
 59 Data Privacy Resolution, supra note 55.  
 60 See Amendments Viewed for Consumer Rights, SHANGHAI DAILY, Apr. 24, 2013, 
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/national/Amendments-viewed-for-consumer-rights/shdaily. 
shtml. 
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Consumer Rights and Interests, which has been in effect for about twenty years, 
does not contain provisions that protect the personal information of 
consumers.61 The proposed amendment would address this omission, affirming 
that consumers are entitled to the rights of name, image and privacy, and that 
business owners should obtain consumers’ consent and explicitly explain the 
purpose, form and scope of information use before collecting and using 
consumers’ personal information, and imposing an obligation on business 
owners to adopt necessary technical measures to ensure security.62 The 
proposed amendment extends existing rules applicable to the Internet 
information services sector to the broader realm of consumer protection, and 
mirrors provisions which have been in effect at the provincial level under 
provincial consumer protection regulations.63  
Thus, there has been a significant legislative response to concerns about 
online privacy. But it is not clear that anything truly meaningful transpired. One 
scholar of the Chinese legal system recently observed:  
Frankly speaking, in the past decades, there are more and more new laws, new 
ordinances, new judicial interpretations, which, many of Chinese citizens 
think, are really no need to make such rules, and too often these rules confused, 
not only us—the common citizens, but also confused lots of judges, that is not 
a good scenario.64  
What is not known about these overlapping privacy guidelines, regulations 
and laws is how often they are invoked, and whether they are ever effectively 
enforced. In 2007 it was widely reported that a Chinese college student in 
Beijing sued Microsoft for violating his privacy with antipiracy software.65 I 
was not able to learn the outcome of this case, however, or find others like it in 
English language media generally or via the English language version of China 
Law Digest, which reports only a total of two cases involving privacy issues, 
one a right of privacy for Hepatitis B carriers and the other basically a notice 
that the “Ministry Of Civil Affairs Emphasizes Respect for Personal Privacy in 
Marriage.” 
III. PRIVACY AND POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE 
In her brilliant book Environmental Litigation in China, Rachel E. Stern 
writes about the political ambivalence endemic to China in the context of 
                                                                                                                       
 61 Id. 
 62 Id.  
 63 See id. 
 64 Liubao Wu, Rebuilding Public Trust and Confidence in Chinese Courts 5 (Jan. 10, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=2283189&download=. 
 65 Gregg Keizer, Chinese Student Sues Microsoft for Privacy Violation, PCWORLD 
(Sept. 18, 2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/137315/article.html. 
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environmental law and litigation.66 She notes that there are many different 
bureaucracies at the provincial and national levels, and they can send 
conflicting signals about important policy issues.67 Additionally, CPC 
representatives vet judicial appointments and sometimes intervene in individual 
court decisions in ways that do not always appear consistent. All of these 
factors work against the formation of a coherent approach to environmental law 
in China.68  
The same sort of ambivalence seems to infuse the CPC approach to privacy 
and the law. Governmental officials charged with economic development are 
likely to have a very different view of the desirability of a privacy infrastructure 
than those involved with maintaining social stability. This sort of fragmented, 
internal-conflict-driven approach to privacy is not unique to the Chinese 
government of course. But China’s political and legal systems can render the 
specific dimensions of the issue uncommonly invisible. There may not be any 
public record whatsoever of efforts taken by citizens to enforce their statutory 
privacy rights. As one reporter noted, “China’s legal system often hands down 
verdicts that the powerless consider unfair. But a bigger problem is that courts 
often refuse to issue any verdict at all—or even acknowledge that some 
bothersome legal complaints exist.”69 In this way the answer to thorny 
questions about politically difficult privacy issues is neither yes nor no.70 
A. Little Anonymity for Anyone Online or Off 
China is divided into twenty-two provinces71 (twenty-three if one includes 
Taiwan, as the CPC prefers to do), four independent municipalities (Beijing, 
                                                                                                                       
 66 See generally STERN, supra note 28. 
 67 See id. at 99. 
 68 Id. at 6–8; Nicholas Calcina Howson, “Quack Corporate Governance” as 
Traditional Chinese Medicine—the Securities Regulation Cannibalization of China’s 
Corporate Law and a State Regulator’s Battle Against State Political Economic Power, 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 331, 2013) (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-009, 
2013) (manuscript at 3), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2279264&download=yes  (“Fifth and finally, I believe that this writing reveals a highly 
complex, and horizontally-oriented, identity of what political scientists have called the PRC 
party state’s ‘fragmented authoritarianism’—or how vertically arranged silo-systems of 
power in what is understood as a unitary party state are permitted to compete and constrain 
horizontally-situated, short-term focused, political economic power in the service of long-
term economic system and development policy goals.”). 
 69 Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 28, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/28/international/asia/28land.html?ex=117 
2466000&en=1c4306de9a1f7a30&ei=5070. 
 70 See id.  
 71 Amanda Briney, China’s 23 Provinces: A List of China’s 23 Provincial Divisions, 
ABOUT.COM, http://geography.about.com/od/chinamaps/a/chinaprovinces.htm (last updated 
June 14, 2010) (stating the area and capital of each province as follows: 1) Qinghai. Area: 
278,457 square miles (721,200 sq. km.); Capital: Xining. 2) Sichuan. Area: 187,260 square 
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Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Tibet), and two special administrative regions 
(Hong Kong and Macau). Each of these political subdivisions has a central 
government, and a court system. Chinese citizens are issued identity cards, 
which they are required—or at least well advised—to keep with them at all 
times.72 The identity cards contain the name, sex, nationality, date of birth, 
address of permanent residence of the bearer, the citizen’s identity number, the 
bearer’s photograph, term of validity of the card and the issuing authority, and 
serve the “purposes of proving the identities of the citizens residing within the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China, safeguarding their legitimate rights 
and interests, facilitating their social activities and maintaining public order.”73 
Under the Hukou system, Chinese citizens are expected—and sometimes 
required—to remain in the province or other subdivision in which they were 
born.74 They need permission to live and work elsewhere in China, and may be 
denied social benefits even if they relocate legally.75 National identity cards are 
                                                                                                                       
miles (485,000 sq. km.); Capital: Chengdu. 3) Gansu. Area: 175,406 square miles (454,300 
sq. km.); Capital: Lanzhou. 4) Heilongjiang. Area: 175,290 square miles (454,000 sq. km.); 
Capital: Harbin. 5) Yunnan. Area: 154,124 square miles (394,000 sq. km.); Capital: 
Kunming. 6) Hunan. Area: 81,081 square miles (210,000 sq. km.); Capital: Changsha. 7) 
Shaanxi. Area: 79,382 square miles (205,600 sq. km.); Capital: Xi’an. 8) Hebei. Area: 
72,471 square miles (187,700 sq. km.); Capital: Shijiazhuang. 9) Jilin. Area: 72,355 square 
miles (187,400 sq. km.); Capital: Changchun. 10) Hubei. Area: 71,776 square miles 
(185,900 sq. km.); Capital: Wuhan. 11) Guangdong. Area: 69,498 square miles (180,000 sq. 
km.); Capital: Guangzhou. 12) Guizhou. Area: 67,953 square miles (176,000 sq. km.); 
Capital: Guiyang. 13) Jiangxi. Area: 64,479 square miles (167,000 sq. km.); Capital: 
Nanchang. 14) Henan. Area: 64,479 square miles (167,000 sq. km.); Capital: Zhengzhou. 
15) Shanxi. Area: 60,347 square miles (156,300 sq. km.); Capital: Taiyuan. 16) Shandong. 
Area: 59,382 square miles (153,800 sq. km.); Capital: Jinan. 17) Liaoning. Area: 56,332 
square miles (145,900 sq. km.); Capital: Shenyang. 18) Anhui. Area: 53,938 square miles 
(139,700 sq. km.); Capital: Hefei. 19) Fujian. Area: 46,834 square miles (121,300 sq. km.); 
Capital: Fuzhou. 20) Jiangsu. Area: 39,614 square miles (102,600 sq. km.); Capital: Nanjing. 
21) Zhejiang. Area: 39,382 square miles (102,000 sq. km.); Capital: Nanjing. 22) Taiwan. 
Area: 13,738 square miles (35,581 sq. km.); Capital: Taipei. 23) Hainan. Area: 13,127 
square miles (34,000 sq. km.); Capital: Haikou); Sara Naumann, List of China’s Provinces: 
Understand the Chinese Provinces, ABOUT.COM, http://gochina.about.com/od/cityareaguides 
inchina/tp/Chinese_Provinces.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). By some accounts, China 
counts Taiwan as its 23rd province. See, e.g., The World Factbook: China, supra note 13. 
 72 See Law of the People’s Republic of China on Resident Identity Cards (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 28, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004) (China), 
available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/06/content_29700.htm. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Aaron Back, China To Speed Up Reform of “Hukou” System, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
18, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244075045781867042848969 
48.html; see also Kam Wing Chan & Will Buckingham, Is China Abolishing the Hukou 
System?, 2008 CHINA Q. 582, 582–84. 
 75 See Chan & Buckingham, supra note 74, at 583; Back, supra note 74; Evan Osnos, 
Abortion and Politics in China, NEW YORKER (June 15, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/06/abortion-and-politics-in-china.html (“What’s more, the 
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one mechanism used by Chinese governmental entities to keep track of where 
people are residing, and with whom they are sharing a home. They are also used 
to track citizens’ domestic travels. An identity card must be proffered to 
purchase a plane or train ticket, or to check into a hotel.  
Chinese citizens are also monitored and tracked online. While this is true 
for most and possibly all citizens of every country, the monitoring is more 
transparent in the sense that everyone knows it is happening very extensively. In 
China all non-commercial websites, including blogs, must be registered, and the 
sites’ developers or owners must provide their identities.76 Similar identity 
registration regulations apply to individuals who engage in microblogging, 
using platforms such as Weibo, a Chinese equivalent of Twitter, and QQ, a 
Facebook-like social media platform.77 This does not seem to dampen 
enthusiasm for the Internet in China, which may be the largest and fastest-
growing market for blog and other social media services in the world: 
According to an official report released by the China Internet Network 
Information Center, as of the end of June 2012, the number of blogs in China 
had reached more than 353 million and about 65.7% of Chinese Internet users 
had their own blogs. In recent years, a vast number of Chinese Internet users 
have also shown strong interest in maintaining their own microblog, or weibo, 
which is the Chinese version of Twitter. More than 273 million microblogs 
have been launched in China, which means that about 50.9% of China’s 
Internet users have been involved in microblogging activities.78 
One of the reasons interest in blogging and microblogging has not been 
discouraged by the instantiation of the real-name policy is the possibility that 
the policy isn’t actually enforced very broadly.79 The enforcement burden is a 
heavy yoke on telecommunications companies that has complicated internecine 
connections with the CPC. The CPC may be allowing a long phase in, or it may 
be too divided to act decisively to compel compliance. 
                                                                                                                       
family was being penalized because of the widely resented ‘household registration’ system, 
which acts [as] a kind of domestic passport to limit migration. Feng and her husband 
reportedly thought they were entitled to a second child because many of their friends were 
(some rural areas are less strict), but it turned out that Feng’s registration, or hukou, was still 
tied to her former address in another province, so she didn’t get the same exemptions to the 
one-child policy. The house-registration system has been widely criticized for creating 
something like an apartheid structure, which prevents people from gaining equal access to 
schools, social services, and jobs.”). 
 76 Jyh-An Lee, Regulating Blogging and Microblogging in China, 91 OR. L. REV. 609, 
612 (2012). 
 77 See generally Rachel Lu, What Happens to Free Speech on Weibo After Real Name 
Registration?, TEA LEAF NATION (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/02/ 
what-happens-to-free-speech-on-weibo-after-real-name-registration/. 
 78 Lee, supra note 76, at 609–10 (footnotes omitted). 
 79 See David Caragliano, Why China’s “Real Name” Internet Policy Doesn’t Work, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:57 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/13/03/why-
chinas-real-name-internet-policy-doesnt-work/274373/. 
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The most salient feature of the CPC’s relationship with the wired world is 
that Chinese leaders do not consider the Internet an unstoppable force for 
openness and democracy; rather, they view the Web as something that is 
fundamentally controllable if adequate attention and resources are deployed 
toward this end. When seemingly omnipresent governmental monitoring 
discerns objectionable communications, communications can be deleted 
expeditiously, and the posters held legally responsible. 
In addition, the Internet service and content providers that permit 
unacceptable-to-authority communications to be distributed online can also be 
held accountable. This means that media companies must stay closely in 
communication with the CPC. As one observer wrote of a high profile unnamed 
Chinese telecom executive: “In the past, W naively believed that he could use 
technology to change society. Now he knows that even if you don’t involve 
yourself in politics, politics will find a way to get involved with you.”80 Chinese 
telecommunications companies engage in significant acts of censorship of their 
networks before the governmental authorities take their turns, to curry favor and 
to try to avoid trouble.81  
Mechanisms of electronic communications control are deployed by the CPC 
for two distinct but related categories of reasons: preventing anything that might 
cause social unrest, especially community organizing, and preserving the 
personal and professional reputations of CPC leaders. As one journalist 
observed, China’s criteria for censoring the Internet involve applying to the 
online environment “the rules that have prevailed since the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown of 1989: do not jeopardise social stability, do not organise and do 
not threaten the party.”82 
B. Communitarian Concerns 
China is a large and diverse country with a long history of armed 
insurrections and a comparatively short history of national unity and relative 
social and economic stability. Retaining a healthy level of social constancy is 
doubtlessly a complicated and difficult endeavor, and I don’t in any way purport 
to have a good sense of how much democracy is politically possible for China 
in the short term. But even peaceful public dialogue is treated as a threat to the 
government when the number of people engaging in the same conversation 
reaches a number high enough to make the CPC uneasy. This is one explanation 
for the persecution of Falun Gong adherents by the CPC, even though Falun 
Gong teachings have never advocated violence or revolution. Falun Gong got 
                                                                                                                       
 80 Wertime, supra note 40. 
 81 See E.H., How Does China Censor the Internet?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2013, 11:50 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-
how-china-censors-internet?fsrc=scn%2Ftw_ec%2Fhow_does_china_censor_the_internet. 
 82 Id. 
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organized, and there were simply too many people joining up and members 
were too enthusiastic for CPC comfort.83 
The Chinese government, at every level, has emphatically embraced the 
power of the Internet in some respects, and uses blogs and other web sites as 
tools to shape public opinion.84 It has long experience in media manipulation. 
Whenever I watch the English language broadcast of CCTV News when I am in 
the country, it seems as though only wonderful things are happening in China, 
but consistently horrible events are occurring abroad: political upheavals, 
natural disasters, and numerous crimes. The only positive thing I ever recall 
seeing broadcast on CCTV about the United States was the time President 
Obama was videoed catching and killing a fly during an interview in 2009. For 
some reason that event got significant television coverage in China, and many 
Chinese people I spoke to in the summer of 2013 still remembered it. 
The CPC presence online is engaged with surreptitiously manipulative tools 
such as astroturfing and search engine optimization.85 According to one scholar, 
“It is reported that an army of government-trained online commentators writes 
blogs in support of the Chinese state and its various stances.”86 Notable China 
scholar Rebecca MacKinnon has reported: 
The [Chinese] government increasingly combines censorship and 
surveillance measures with pro-active efforts to steer online conversations in 
the direction it prefers. In 2008 the Hong Kong-based researcher David 
Bandurski determined that at least 280,000 people had been hired at various 
levels of government to work as “online commentators.” Known derisively as 
the “fifty cent party,” these people are paid to write postings that show their 
employers in a favorable light in online chat rooms, social networking services, 
blogs, and comments sections of news websites. Many more people do similar 
work as volunteers—recruited from among the ranks of retired officials as well 
as college students in the Communist Youth League who aspire to become 
Party members.87 
That being said, the CPC will often circulate reports about government 
failures and even government corruption—just not all of them, and generally 
from a very circumspect and verifiable fact-deficient perspective. To me it 
                                                                                                                       
 83 See generally LAO CHENG-WU, THE REFUTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FALUN GONG 
(2012). 
 84 See Jesper Schlaeger & Min Jiang, Battering Ram, Virus, or Politics as Usual? A 
Case Study of Chinese Local Government Microblogging 5 (July 1, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258565. 
 85 See Nate Anderson, 280,000 Pro-China Astroturfers Are Running Amok Online, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 26, 2010, 11:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/03/280000-
pro-china-astroturfers-are-running-amok-online/. 
 86 Lee, supra note 76, at 612. 
 87 Rebecca MacKinnon, Visiting Fellow, Ctr. for Info. Tech. Policy, Princeton Univ., 
Testimony Before the Congressional–Executive Commission on China 8 (Mar. 1, 2010) 
(footnote omitted).  
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looks very much like some people within the CPC want to do the right thing by 
Chinese citizens some of the time, but are restrained by a fear of undermining 
Party authority or angering the wrong person. 
Collective criticisms are of less concern to the government than one might 
expect; it is unauthorized collective organizing that is most feared. References 
to Taiwan, Tibet and the spring 1989 incident known as the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre are by some accounts censored primarily to reduce the risk that they 
will be used as foundational organizing tools for protests and rebellion. I was 
surprised by how open some Chinese people were to discussing these matters 
with me. Many had family members in Taiwan they talked about, or expressed a 
desire to visit Tibet. Because the so-called Tiananmen Uprising was actually 
dispersed geographically, and included protests in large cities such as Shanghai, 
Chengdu and Guangzhou,88 people well outside of Beijing had participated in, 
observed, or otherwise been affected by that event and were open to talking 
about it in limited ways. With a few exceptions, the only time the topic came up 
in my presence was when somebody else raised it. But once it was raised, I 
asked questions and heard a number of opinions in response. A couple of people 
even showed me photographs of students petitioning their government during 
the optimistic first few days of the democracy protests. What I heard in China 
from Chinese people was consistent with what I’d read89 and also heard from 
Chinese immigrants who relocated to the United States in 1989 after 
participating in the movement, to avoid being jailed for their activities. As 
China expert Jeffrey Wasserstrom noted: 
Other writers misleading[ly] present the taboo regarding discussion of the June 
4th Massacre in a manner that suggests a Big Brother state is tightly 
monitoring even the most private conversations, when the reality is that many 
people in China now feel free (and indeed are free), as they weren’t always 
before, to talk among themselves about even hot-button topics, such as the 
crackdown in 1989, that would likely get them into trouble if they published 
about them or held meetings to discuss them.90 
That the CPC tolerates generalized criticism is illustrated by its relationship 
to Mo Yan, the Chinese author who received the 2012 Nobel Prize for 
                                                                                                                       
 88 Claudia Rosett, Remembering Tiananmen Square, FORBES (May 28, 2009, 12:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/27/tiananmen-square-anniversary-mao-opinions-
columnists-china.html (“the movement . . . brought millions into the streets, not only in 
Beijing, but in other major cities like Shanghai, Chengdu, Guangzhou”). 
 89 E.g., JEFFREY N. WASSERSTROM, CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW 72–75 (2010). 
 90 Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Illuminating and Misleading Takes on China 20 Years Since 
Tiananmen, HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-
wasserstrom/illuminating-and-misleadi_b_211610.html; cf. Christopher Beam, What Does 
the Chinese Government Say Happened at Tiananmen Square?, SLATE MAG. (June 3, 2009, 
7:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/06/tussle_in_tian 
anmen_square.html. 
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Literature.91 “Bull,” a short story by Mr. Yan that was translated into English 
and published in the November 26, 2012 issue of the New Yorker, features 
corruption and the distribution of unhealthy foods right from the opening 
paragraph, which reads as follows: 
It was Lao Lan who invented the scientific method of forcing pressurized 
water into the pulmonary arteries of slaughtered animals. With this method, 
you could empty a bucketful of water into a two-hundred-jin pig, while with 
the old method you could barely empty half a bucket of water into the carcass 
of a dead cow. The amount of money that the clever townspeople have spent 
on water from our village when they thought they were paying for meat in the 
years since will never be known, but I’m sure it would be a shockingly high 
figure.92 
The Lao Lan character is later described as a rich official who injected 
formaldehyde into the meat he sold so that it would not spoil, a bully, and a 
coward. Novels written by Mr. Mo “have touched on many of contemporary 
China’s most sensitive themes, including the Cultural Revolution and the 
country’s strict family-planning policies,” and “have been judged subversive 
because of their sharp criticism of contemporary Chinese society.”93 And his 
books were published with the authority and permission of the CPC. Mo Yan is 
not just tolerated by the Chinese government, but actually employed by it. He 
serves as vice chairman of the State-run Chinese Writers’ Association.94 
Additionally, the CPC indirectly polices and criticizes itself. Newspapers 
are owned and controlled by the Party, and the government employs the 
journalists who fill their pages. In consequence, some topics are never covered 
and others are addressed in skewed or blatantly dishonest ways. Nevertheless, 
some of China’s social problems are identified and discussed, and governmental 
actions are criticized in official publications. My journalist and journalism 
professor friend and fellow 2011–2012 China Fulbrighter, Jill Hamburg 
Coplan,95 has passionately explained that many journalists in China want to do 
the right thing and keep pushing for a freer press. Incidents that are too big to 
                                                                                                                       
 91 Andrew Jacobs & Sarah Lyall, After Fury over 2010 Peace Prize, China Embraces 
Nobel Selection, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/books/ 
nobel-literature-prize.html?pagewanted=all. 
 92 Mo Yan, Bull, NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/fiction/fea 
tures/2012/11/26/121126fi_fiction_mo#ixzz2DMlWi0SI. 
 93 Jacobs & Lyall, supra note 91. 
 94  Id. (“Mr. Mo, 57, is hardly a tool of the Communist Party; much of his work is laced 
with social criticism, and he is admired by readers of Chinese literature abroad as much as 
he is hugely popular in his own country. But he does not consider himself political, and his 
decision not to take a stand against the government—as well as his position as vice chairman 
of the state-run Chinese Writers’ Association—has drawn criticism from Chinese dissident 
writers.”). 
 95 See generally Jill Hamburg Coplan, COPLANS IN CHINA: A FULBRIGHT YEAR IN 
BEIJING, AND BEYOND, http://coplansinchina.com/ (last updated Sept. 29, 2013). 
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hide are now covered with surprising thoroughness. This was not readily 
observable as recently as 2008 in the aftermath of the massive Sichuan 
earthquake, when the New York Times accused the Chinese government of a 
campaign to silence the surviving victims and the media, resorting to 
harassment by police and threats of imprisonment.96 But now social media 
platforms, though ostensibly under CPC control, are forcing the CPC to 
communicate more actively and perhaps more openly. 
When a high speed rail crash that killed forty people and injured 172 
occurred in 2011, the power of Weibo (a Chinese homologue to Twitter) was 
unequivocally displayed, as thirty million messages about the collision were 
posted too quickly to be effectively censored.97 Mainstream CPC censors who 
controlled Chinese news outlets may have felt pressured by this online 
outpouring to offer more extensive coverage of the tragic event than they 
otherwise might have. The magnitude of the online public dialogue also may 
have motivated the government to act more dramatically than it would have 
with less public interest or scrutiny. The CPC-administered Chinese media has 
reported that CPC authorities are punishing fifty-four people deemed 
responsible for the technical problems that led to the collision, and actually 
named at least three of them publicly: Liu Zhijun, the country’s former railway 
minister, Zhang Shuguang, the railway ministry’s former deputy chief engineer, 
and Ma Cheng, former chairman of board at China Railway Signal and 
Communication Corporation (CRSC), producer of the railway signaling system 
which failed.98 Liu Zhijun was charged with bribery and abuse of power, which 
are potentially death penalty offenses in China.99 
The authorized press sometimes also covers fairly extreme failings by the 
Chinese criminal justice system. For example, in 2005 the CPC-managed China 
Daily News reported that: “A Chinese woman believed to have been killed in 
the 1980s reappeared 16 years after the alleged killer was executed.”100 The 
article raises a stunning number of issues in very few words, including human 
trafficking, the incorrect identification of a corpse, potential perjury, fear of the 
                                                                                                                       
 96 See Sichuan Earthquake, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
news/science/topics/earthquakes/Sichuan_province_china/index.html.  
 97 C. Custer, The Wenzhou Crash and the Future of Weibo, TECH ASIA (Aug. 1, 2011, 
5:00 PM), http://www.techinasia.com/the-wenzhou-crash-and-the-future-of-weibo/; Kenneth 
Rapoza, In China Train Crash, Sina’s Weibo Breaks News, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/08/01/in-china-train-crash-sinas-weibo-breaks-
news/; see also Zhan Zhang, Rock the Journalism–the Function of Weibo in Foreign 
Media’s News Practice in China (Apr. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258101&download=yes. 
 98 54 Punished over Train Crash, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 28, 2011, http://europe.china 
daily.com.cn/china/2011-12/28/content_14346197.htm. 
 99 Cao Yin & An Baijie, Former Railways Minister Charged with Bribery, CHINA 
DAILY, Apr. 11, 2013, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/11/content_1639159 
4.htm. 
 100 “Victim” Reappears After “Murderer” Executed, CHINA DAILY, June 17, 2005, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/17/content_452336.htm.  
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legal system, and the possibility that torture had been used to obtain a coerced 
confession, stating in pertinent part: 
Shi Xiaorong was declared a “murder victim” by local police in April 
1987 in Mayang county in Central China’s Hunan Province after a 
dismembered body was found in a Mayang river.  
Shi said she was actually swindled and sold to Shandong Province as 
somebody’s wife in March that year. 
Teng Xingshan, a butcher, was convicted of the murder as the local police 
said the dismemberment technique was “very professional.” He was executed 
in 1989 despite pleas of innocence. 
According to police investigation material, Teng was believed to have 
sexual relations with Shi and killed her on suspicions of her stealing his 
money.  
But Shi, who is now in a Guizhou jail for drug trafficking, said she did not 
know Teng, urging the authorities to rectify the case. 
Shi returned to her hometown in Guizhou Province in 1993 and Teng’s 
relatives [were] told she was still alive one year later. But it took years for 
them to verify the information and they did not have the funds and the courage 
to take the case to court until Teng’s daughter and son lodged a lawsuit at the 
Hunan Higher People’s court last month. 
The 1989 verdict of the court reads that: “Teng confessed his crimes and 
his confession conformed with scientific inspections and identifications.” 
Whether torture was used in trial is still unknown.101 
As if all that wasn’t shocking enough, the article concludes by noting 
another wrongful murder conviction that had been recently reported, which also 
included allegations of a confession obtained by torture: 
The case came two months after the She Xianglin case in Hubei Province. 
She Xianglin served 11 years in prison for “murdering” his wife in 1994 who 
reappeared in 2005.  
She was later declared innocent and released from the prison. 
Former security guard She claimed he was deprived of sleep during 10 
days of interrogation until he signed documents pleading guilty to murder. He 
is now suing the government for compensation over his mistrial and torture 
during interrogation.102 
There are, however, many important details missing in these accounts, such 
as the names of anyone working for the government who was involved in the 
arrest, conviction and execution of Teng Xingshan or the arrest, conviction and 
imprisonment of She Xianglin. The names of the police officers are not 
provided, nor the names of the judges involved, nor even the names of any 
witnesses. Some people involved have clearly had their personal privacy 
                                                                                                                       
 101 Id. 
 102 Id.; see also “Murder Victim” Reappears After “Killer” Executed, CHINA.ORG.CN 
(June 17, 2005), http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Jun/132377.htm. 
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respected at the expense of a full account of reported events. Both cases appear 
to have been reported as the public-opinion-shaping part of an initiative to give 
the Supreme People’s Court jurisdiction over all appeals in death penalty 
cases.103 The death penalty itself continues to be favored by Chinese citizens,104 
despite the Teng case and others in which innocent people may well have been 
executed105 and perhaps in small part because of a sense that legal reforms have 
                                                                                                                       
 103 See Calum MacLeod, China Plans To Use Death Penalty More Sparingly, USA 
TODAY, May 16, 2006, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-05-15-china-
death_x.htm; COMM. AGAINST TORTURE, CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY 
STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONVENTION 3 (2008), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/CAT.C.CHN.CO.4.pdf. 
 104 Zi Heng Lim, Why China Executes So Many People, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2013, 9:30 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/why-china-executes-so-many-peo 
ple/275695/. 
 105 China Murderer Awaits Trial After Innocent Man Executed: Report, SINO DAILY 
(Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.sinodaily.com/reports/China_murderer_awaits_trial_after_inno 
cent_man_executed_report_999.html (“Hugejiletu was put to death in June 1996 for the rape 
and murder of a woman in the toilet of a textile factory in Hohhot, capital of the northern 
region of Inner Mongolia, the Beijing News reported. Hugejiletu, who had reported the case 
to police, had maintained he was innocent despite attempts to get him to confess. In October 
2005, a man named Zhao Zhihong was arrested by police and confessed to killing 10 people 
in Inner Mongolia, including the woman murdered in the factory, the state-run newspaper 
said.”); Jiabao Du, Failing Trust in China’s Courts: Is Wang Shujin the Last Straw?, TEA 
LEAF NATION (July 8, 2013), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/07/failing-public-trust-in-
chinas-courts/ (“In 2005, Wang Shujin was arrested and confessed to four cases of murder 
and rape, including that of Nie Shubin’s case, stunning the entire country and the Nie family. 
However, this twist of fate has not, as of yet, affected Nie Shubin’s case. In an interview 
with the Oriental Morning Post on June 25, Zhang Huanzhi said she has gone to the High 
Court of Hebei Province every month for the past eight years to appeal to overturn her son’s 
sentence and she has always been told to ‘wait for notice at home.’ The public and legal 
scholars suspect that Nie Shubin was wronged because the courts have been delaying their 
response. Nie Shubin was convicted based solely on his confession – which many believe 
was forced. Aside from his oral confession, prosecutors did not prove his guilt with 
witnesses or physical evidence such as fingerprints, blood, or semen. In recent years, many 
staggering injustices similar to Nie’s case have come to light. In part due to assuming 
suspects are guilty and requiring that their innocence be proven, instead of the other way 
around, Chinese courts have maintained a very high conviction rate—99.9% in 2009, 
according to official statistics—so it is no surprise that some of those who stand trial are 
wrongly convicted. In March 2013, Zhang Hui and Zhang Gaoping were released from jail 
after serving 10 years for being convicted of raping and killing a girl whom they gave a free 
ride. In 2011, a famous lawyer named Zhu Mingyong and a respected prosecutor named 
Zhang Biao succeeded in soliciting the High Court in Hangzhou City in Zhejiang Province 
to reinvestigate and retry the case. It was found that the DNA left in the victim’s nails 
matched the DNA of a criminal who was convicted of rape and murder and executed in 
2005. The Zhangs said they were tortured for multiple consecutive days and nights to 
confess. In May 2010, Zhao Zuohai was released from jail after serving 11 years because the 
victim named Zhao Zhenshang whom he was convicted of murdering in 1999 returned. It 
was found that the victim’s body had been misidentified by the family as Zhao Zhenshang. 
In May 2005, after serving 11 years, She Xianglin was acquitted because his wife, whom he 
was charged with murdering in 1995, went back home for a visit. She had moved to another 
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been made that might prevent innocent people from being executed in the 
future.  
The CPC has also allowed a wrenching widespread societal debate within 
China about how Chinese people should treat each other, in terms of offering 
assistance to strangers. I noticed, while traveling and living there, that China 
does not seem to have a very vibrant culture of Samaritanism. When I asked 
Chinese people about this, they unerringly told me the Parable of the Nanjing 
Judge. Around 2006 an unnamed Nanjing judge “made headlines . . . when he 
blamed a good Samaritan for knocking an old lady over in the street because 
‘common sense’ meant only the guilty help the injured.”106 By one account: 
[A] young person named Peng Yu . . . kindly helped up an old woman who had 
fallen down, and at the request of the old woman took her to the hospital. The 
result was that this old woman then maintained that it was Peng Yu who [was] 
the person who had knocked her down. Peng Yu strongly denied that he 
knocked over the old woman. Both sides eventually went to court and Peng Yu 
was fined in the first instance to bear a portion of the old woman’s medical 
expensies [sic], totally [sic] over 40,000 yuan, on the basis “common sense” 
that: “According to society’s logic/reason, if Peng Yu was doing a good deed, 
Peng Yu could have let the old woman’s family send her to the hospital after 
they arrived, and then leave on his own. However Peng Yu did not make such 
a choice, and his actions contradict what is reasonable”; “Peng Yu, on the day 
of the incident, paid the old woman over 200 yuan and even did not request 
that the old woman pay him back”; etc.107 
This incident triggered massive online discussions, with one website’s blog 
homepage claiming that a survey had ascertained that 80% of bloggers had 
chosen not to be good people anymore as a result.108 This Nanjing judge 
story109 continues to be invoked by some people in China to justify not helping 
strangers in distress; others raise it to call for changes in the culture. In 2011 a 
video of a two-year-old girl getting struck by a vehicle in a hit-and-run accident 
                                                                                                                       
province and remarried. In April 1994, the police found a body and determined it was She 
Xianglin’s wife and that he had killed her. She Xianglin said he was tortured for ten days 
and ten nights. Other well-known injustices include Du Peiwu’s case, Wu Daquan’s, 
Hutengjile’s, Zhang Zhenfeng’s, and Teng Xingshan’s. These and other cases continue to 
erode the Chinese people’s belief in their judiciary and government. Wrote Xu Xin, ‘Nie 
Shubin’s case might be the last straw that causes the judiciary to collapse.’”). See generally 
id. 
 106 Only the Guilty Help the Injured: Legacy of the “Nanjing Judge” All Too Apparent 
as Passers-By Ignore Hit-Run Toddler, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 19, 2011, 
http://www.smh.com.au/world/only-the-guilty-help-the-injured-legacy-of-the-nanjing-judge-
all-too-apparent-as-passersby-ignore-hitrun-toddler-20111019-1m6sv.html. 
 107 Fauna, Bystanders Only Help After Old Man Says He Fell by Himself, 
CHINASMACK (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.chinasmack.com/2009/stories/bystanders-only-
help-after-old-man-says-he-fell-by-himself.html. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id.  
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in China and then being ignored by more than a dozen passers-by as she lay 
critically injured on the road went viral and sparked another substantial round of 
online debate.110 In 2012 an American college student studying in China was 
broadly praised in the media and on social networking platforms because he 
bought some food for a poor old woman who was begging.111 Chinese people 
again engaged in extensive discussions, sometimes exhorting each other to 
engage in similar small acts of kindness. But then in 2013 accounts of innocent 
women who got kidnapped and murdered after unadvisedly offering assistance 
to criminals who faked distress were widely publicized, with the clear message 
that helping strangers can be a very risky endeavor.112 Whether any part of this 
debate is being steered by the CPC is not known, but certainly a lot of diverse 
and passionate viewpoints have been on display, with little defense of the 
anonymous but government-employed CPC member Nanjing Judge. 
What the CPC will not tolerate are targeted efforts to foment revolution or 
otherwise undermine Party authority. It’s generally understood that 
unauthorized coordinated outdoor gatherings are forbidden, and are met with 
                                                                                                                       
 110 See Apathy Toward Injured Child Sparks Public Outcry in China, XINHUA (Oct. 17, 
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 112 See Michelle Florcruz, Attack and Murder of Chinese Teenager Draws Additional 
Fears of Being a Good Samaritan, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:55 PM), 
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violence and arrests, because in 1989 the world watched the CPC respond 
repressively to the Tiananmen Square Uprising, until the government seized all 
of the cameras and evicted or arrested the reporters. What is less widely 
recognized is that smaller scale protests occur in some part of China every day. 
Because the mainstream media in China is controlled by the CPC, these 
incidents are not reported by the domestic press, but information about at least 
some of them makes its way into foreign newspapers, or is succinctly and 
somewhat opaquely communicated via social media platforms. I personally 
witnessed several large demonstrations that resulted in the appearance of 
numerous police cars in Shanghai, Beijing, Urumqi, Chengdu and Hangzhou. 
Because I could not read Chinese, and was afraid to take pictures or approach 
strangers to ask questions, I don’t have a good sense of what most of the 
disputes were about. I know that at least one was related to religion and two to 
land disputes with the government. One involved the death of a man while he 
was in police custody. They were not covered in the English versions of the 
Chinese press or in any international press venue as far as I could ascertain. In 
every case protesters were unambiguously dispersed or taken into custody by 
authorities. The CPC seems determined to prevent mass gatherings of people in 
furtherance of common goals, regardless of what the goals may be. There are 
even large contingents of People’s Liberation Army soldiers at Chinese athletic 
events, apparently there to make sure the crowds in attendance are not diverted 
to other purposes, while public safety issues are addressed by local police 
officers. 
All this obviously does not dissuade everyone from activism, though. By 
one account there are 180,000 “mass incidents” of protest every year.113 In the 
autumn of 2011 an entire fishing village in Guangdong province, Wukan, rose 
in insurrection and drove CPC officials out of its borders to protest violence and 
corruption related to confiscations of land, and remained in conflict with the 
government for months.114 This affair was not mentioned by official Chinese 
news outlets while it was happening, and references to it were censored from 
the Internet, but everyone I spoke to in China seemed to know about it. The 
Communist Party Secretary who had an office and leadership position in the 
law school where I was posted (Tongji University Law School) was away 
during this interval, reportedly involved with negotiations in Wukan by some 
accounts, but he relayed a different reason to me for his absence, which had 
required him to cancel a visit to his son’s school he had scheduled for me. After 
the situation was defused, however, the problem was publicly attributed to 
corrupt actions by bad apple CPC officials acting outside the scope of their 
authority.115 Once the central government in Beijing was made aware of the 
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situation, the CPC account averred: it was rectified.116 Accepting this official 
account of events was probably a very savvy move on the part of the people of 
Wukan. I do not know if there were later repercussions. 
There are smaller and subtler acts of protest as well. Many times as I 
entered or left the gates of Tongji University during the 2011–2012 academic 
year I passed by people in small groups or alone who held handmade posters 
and handed out papers expressing some political view or personal grievance. In 
one instance I was informed by several students that protesters were expressing 
opposition to the Communist Party Secretary in residence at Tongji University 
Law School, though on what basis I do not know, because the students I asked 
were unwilling to discuss the details with me beyond saying, “They do not think 
he is good.”  
On one occasion I took a group of about thirty Tongji law students to the 
U.S. Consulate in Shanghai to observe rounds of a moot court competition 
being held there. A law school faculty member also accompanied us, naturally. 
We all took the subway together and then as we walked to the appropriate 
building several students suggested that group photos be taken. Everyone lined 
up on some stairs, and students asked a passing stranger to take some pictures 
so that everybody could be in them. As she was working her way through the 
numerous cameras lined up at her feet, a police officer appeared and ordered us 
to disperse. The law professor who had come along began walking toward him 
to explain who we were and what we were doing there, but before he had a 
chance the woman juggling the cameras yelled in a stentorian voice, “We are 
citizens of Shanghai and we can stand on the sidewalk and take photos if we 
want to!” Or at least I was told that is what she shouted by my students, while 
they cheered and burst into applause at these unexpected words of resistance, 
just as a group of students being pointlessly hassled by a police officer in the 
United States might do. It was a small and unexpectedly emotional moment of 
bonding across cultures that I will never forget. 
On a far less happy or inspiring note, in July of 2013 a man set off a bomb 
in the Beijing airport. The New York Times account of the incident stated in 
pertinent part: 
According to documents posted on the Internet, Mr. Ji, who had earned his 
living transporting people on a motorcycle, was paralyzed from the waist down 
in 2005 after security officers in the southern city of Dongguan beat him for 
operating an unlicensed transport service. In a petition letter detailing his 
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 116 See Silverstein, supra note 115; Jiang, supra note 115. 
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plight, Mr. Ji said he had been left with $16,000 in medical bills. “Almost 
without hope, petition road endless,” he wrote at one point.117 
The article is a lot more sympathetic toward the accused bomber than one 
typically witnesses in an article about what might reasonably be characterized 
as an act of terrorism. Official Chinese accounts were quite different, 
equivocating about whether his injury was caused by a beating or an unrelated 
motorcycle accident, and whether he had received justice from the Chinese 
legal system.118  
Now consider another stunning example of political protest involving the 
rigging of financial markets: 
China experienced a bizarre numerological happening [on June 4, 2012]. 
The Shanghai Composite Index started [the] morning at 2346.98, which, when 
read from right to left, shared an uncanny similarity to [the day’s] highly 
sensitive anniversary: twenty-three years since the June 4, 1989, crackdown on 
pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing, an event known in Chinese as “six-
four.”119  
The possibility that this was a coincidence seemed small indeed when six 
hours later, the numbers struck again, and the market closed the day down 64.89 
points.120 Sitting in my apartment in Shanghai while this unfolded, I couldn’t 
decide which was more remarkable, the fact that someone had probably risked 
her life to make a political point by manipulating the market, or the fact that the 
market was hackable generally, which was surely very alarming to investors 
who couldn’t care less about China’s long term prospects for democracy. 
References to the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Shanghai Composite Index and 
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Man, SHANGHAI DAILY, July 22, 2013, http://english.sina.com/china/2013/0721/61074 
3.html. 
 119 What Happened on the Shanghai Stock Exchange?, NEW YORKER (June 5, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/06/what-happened-on-the-shang 
hai-stock-exchange.html (emphasis omitted). 
 120 See NTDTV, Bizarre Stock Market Numbers “Commemorate” China’s Tiananmen 
Massacre, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j479cI82OSg; What 
Happened on the Shanghai Stock Exchange?, supra note 119; Keith Bradsher, Market’s 
Echo of Tiananmen Date Sets Off Censors, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/06/05/world/asia/anniversary-of-tiananmen-crackdown-echos-through-shanghai-
market.html?pagewanted=all. 
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many related terms were reportedly censored from Chinese Internet. Unlike 
during the Wukan event, where I was thrown off the Internet every time I 
searched for related information while the protest was unfolding, I was able to 
follow the story in real time using my Virtual Private Network (VPN) for a few 
hours, before the filtering became more effective. I wondered whether my 
students knew anything about this, but it was not the sort of thing I asked them 
about and none of them raised it. I did inquire of one of my faculty monitors, 
who confirmed that he was aware it had happened, but quickly changed the 
subject. 
Finally, high profile Chinese dissidents such as artist Ai Weiwei risk their 
lives and those of their families and friends by openly criticizing the Chinese 
government. Ai Weiwei has a high enough profile that the CPC seems reluctant 
to permanently remove him from public view.121 The same is not true for his 
friends, however, several of whom are “missing.”122 His lawyers have also been 
detained incommunicado, or worse, to prevent them from effectively 
representing Ai Weiwei on tax charges and other matters.123 Practitioners of 
Falun Gong similarly put themselves at risk, as is evidenced by this CPC-
sanctioned report of Falun Gong being arrested for faking torture photos.124 
Readers are clearly supposed to conclude that any evidence of physical abuse 
proffered by Falun Gong has been fabricated, and also to absorb the more 
                                                                                                                       
 121 See generally Ai Weiwei, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
reference/timestopics/people/a/ai_weiwei/index.html. 
 122 See Tiffany Ap, Four of Ai Weiwei’s Friends Have Also Been Missing for Weeks 
New Reports Say, SHANGHAIIST (May 23, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://shanghaiist.com/2011/ 
05/23/four_of_ai_weiweis_friends_have_als.php; Concern for Missing Chinese Artist Ai 
Weiwei, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 5, 2011, 8:46 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/ 
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 123 See Adam Martin, Lawyer for Ai Weiwei Is Released from Detention, ATLANTIC 
WIRE (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/04/lawyer-detained-
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Lawyer and Designer Are Latest To Disappear, GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 2011, http://www.guar 
dian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/15/ai-weiwei-lawyer-designer-disappear; Ai Weiwei’s Lawyer 
Was Missing as the Tax Hearing Approaches, GLOBAL VOICES (June 21, 2012), 
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g-approaches/; cf. Melissa Chan, Chatting with China’s Security Apparatus, AL JAZEERA 
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/asia/chatting-chinas-security-apparatus (“Al 
Jazeera’s team decided to speak to rights attorney Pu Zhiqiang, known for his work 
representing Ai Weiwei and himself an object of frequent police surveillance, to solicit his 
opinion. What happened next was not surprising, but on this day, felt particularly ironic: 
plainclothes police officers prevented us from interviewing Pu on camera, even as we 
explained to them that this new legislation would curtail their state security powers.”). 
 124 16 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested, SHANGHAI DAILY, June 4, 2013, 
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/national/16-Falun-Gong-practitioners-arrested/shdaily.shtml. 
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generalized information that depicting torture online and blaming the 
government for it may bring one into conflict with the authorities.  
Most experts believe that the only way China will become more democratic 
is via reforms within the CPC, rather than from outside pressure.125 Chinese 
leaders are unable to prevent events that pressure them to make changes, but 
they can control the flow of information about these events to a surprising 
degree, and they will not relinquish any of their power over communications 
lightly. They may, if sufficiently motivated, decide to wield this power to create 
more privacy within the culture, or simply to create a greater illusion of privacy. 
But their self-protective instincts are very strong. 
C. Individual Concerns 
As noted above, Chinese law provides a right of reputation such that “[i]f a 
citizen’s right of personal name, portrait, reputation or honour is infringed upon, 
he shall have the right to demand that the infringement be stopped, his 
reputation be rehabilitated, the ill effects be eliminated and an apology be made; 
he may also demand compensation for losses.”126 There are accounts in the 
Chinese media of private citizens prevailing in court over those who had lied 
about them. Usually the facts in these reports are fairly extreme and somewhat 
improbable; such as one in which a person was accused of causing an accident 
when in fact he had rendered first aid to someone who was hurt and even got 
injured himself in the process of assisting the victim.127 Stories like this are 
understood by Chinese citizens to be cautionary tales intended to influence 
behavior. In this case, the message is that liars are found out and punished, so 
people should not be dishonest. It also serves as a rhetorical justification for 
proactive censorship; since spreading lies publicly would have only hurt an 
innocent party. 
Other times the cases seem real, as with this report: 
China’s landmark [Internet privacy] case occurred in 2008 after the “death 
blog” of a woman named Jiang Yan. Her blog depicted the sorrow she felt 
about her husband Wang Fei’s extramarital affair. Jiang later killed herself, 
leading to outrage at Wang Fei on the Chinese Internet, prompting a Human 
Flesh Search. The search dug up his personal information and place of 
employment, leading to public harassment and offline protests that caused 
Wang Fei to lose his job. After Wang sued popular websites Daqi.com, 
Tianya.com, and a netizen named Zhang Leyi for emotional distress, a court 
                                                                                                                       
 125 For example, see the body of works on China by James Fallows, Peter Hessler, Evan 
Osnos and Jeffrey Wasserstrom. See generally WASSERSTROM, supra note 89. 
 126 Jingchun, supra note 2, at 658. 
 127 See id. at 657 (discussing the Wang example). 
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ruled in favor of Wang and ordered Daqi.com and Zhang to pay out 8,000 
RMB (about US $1,160).128  
The publication of this potentially verifiable story seems to be a warning 
against public vigilantism, which is an increasing concern of the CPC, 
especially when it is related to accusations of corruption by CPC members. The 
CPC would prefer to police its own members outside the view of the public, but 
understandably hesitates to say this directly. 
Individuals within the CPC leadership clearly understand the importance of 
privacy generally, and most particularly to themselves. Status, power and “face” 
(reputation) are matters of acute personal concern. Individual criticisms are very 
deeply feared by party leaders. It is said that “in ancient Chinese society, the 
rights enjoyed by a person were accorded in relation to one’s social status and 
one’s status in the family system.”129 Certainly CPC leaders enjoy the practical 
ability to control communications about themselves far more than most 
Chinese. They can also punish speakers who displease them. By some accounts, 
the harshness of the response to the Tiananmen Uprising was driven by anger 
over personal attacks against Deng Xiao Ping and other leaders in the chants 
and slogans used by protesters.  
One internet researcher determined that the largest share of blocked words 
on China’s largest social media platform are the names of CPC members. 
“[P]rotection from criticism on Weibo seems to be a perk for rising up the 
ranks” of the Communist Party, he concluded.130 
Much more recently, Bloomberg News and Business Week were blocked 
from Chinese Internet after reporting on the extensive wealth of Xi Jinping’s 
family in the Spring of 2012.131 The New York Times was blocked in October of 
2012 after publishing reports about the exorbitant wealth of Wen Jiabao’s 
family.132 The conclusion that family wealth is something these men did not 
want to have disclosed is inescapable. The reasons why this information is 
viewed as sensitive are not hard to guess, as the reported facts surrounding the 
acquisitions of these vast fortunes suggest political corruption. 
                                                                                                                       
 128 Vincent Capone, In Chinese Netizen Outrage, Echoes of Mao-Era Struggle, TEA 
LEAF NATION (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.tealeafnation.com/2012/09/in-chinese-netizen-
outrage-echoes-of-mao-era-struggle/. 
 129 WANG, supra note 43, at 37. 
 130 JASON Q. NG, BLOCKED ON WEIBO: WHAT GETS SUPPRESSED ON CHINA’S VERSION 
OF TWITTER (AND WHY) xviii (2013). 
 131 Bloomberg Sites Blocked in China Days After Xi Family Wealth Story, REUTERS, 
July 4, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/04/us-china-censorship-
bloomberg-idUSBRE86306820120704; China Blocks Bloomberg Site After Report on 
Leader, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 29, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/ 
2012-06-29/china-blocks-bloomberg-site-after-report-on-leader. 
 132 Keith Bradsher, China Blocks Web Access to Times After Article, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/china-blocks-web-access-to-new-
york-times.html; WANG, supra note 43, at 92. 
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Previous negative reporting about China by these news organizations had 
been more general, and (apparently) less objectionable, but also fairly extensive. 
All three of those outlets had reported about hot button topics including 
Tiananmen, Tibet, Taiwan, Falun Gong, Wukan, the Bo Xilai scandal in 
Chongqing and the Shanghai Stock Market weirdness without overarching 
repercussions (though of course individual articles were blocked from 
distribution). It was only after the exhaustively researched financial information 
about the families of the incoming Chinese President and outgoing Chinese 
Premier was reported that the entire publications became Internet blockaded on 
a wholesale basis. And from what I hear from my friends in China, the 
censorship was unusually effective. Educated, politically savvy people knew 
something big had happened, but they had a really hard time figuring out what it 
was. 
CPC leaders also want privacy when using their own phones and 
computers, and worry about having their own communications monitored. By 
some accounts Bo Xilai, former leader of Chongqing province and rising star in 
the CPC, sealed his political downfall and doom by carrying out his own 
surveillance campaign of people in the CPC leadership.133 The watchers do not 
like to be watched. Part of the reason Google was banned from Chinese Internet 
was the impression that the company was inadequately controlling search 
results that broadcast private information about CPC leaders and their 
families.134 
IV. CENSORSHIP, COUNTERFEITING AND CONSUMER PRIVACY 
The Chinese media is, as explained above, widely known to be controlled 
by the Chinese government. The Chinese people assume that is also true in 
nations like the United States because that is what they are told. Stories from the 
United States about gun violence dominate the Chinese media’s international 
coverage, and Chinese citizens believe this is the tip of a massive undisclosed 
iceberg of violence in the United States, as would be the case in China, where 
crime stories are significantly underreported for politically instrumental reasons. 
Many Chinese people assume they will see gunfights if they visit the United 
                                                                                                                       
 133 See Ian Johnson & Jonathan Ansfield, Key Figure in Scandal That Felled Bo Xilai Is 
Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/asia/key-
figure-in-bo-xilai-scandal-is-charged.html?hp (“The report also contended that Mr. Wang 
abused power by illegally spying on people. Sources have said the tech-savvy Mr. Wang 
wiretapped a wide range of people, including top government leaders, with Mr. Bo’s 
approval.”). 
 134 James Glanz & John Markoff, Vast Hacking by a China Fearful of the Web, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/world/asia/05wikileaks-china. 
html?pagewanted=all (“But Chinese officials became alarmed that Google still did less than 
its Chinese rivals to remove material Chinese officials considered offensive. Such material 
included information about Chinese dissidents and human rights issues, but also about 
central and provincial Chinese leaders and their children—considered an especially taboo 
topic, interviews with people quoted in the cables reveal.”). 
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States. Of course, some visitors from China do. And having lost two family 
members to gun violence, I am not really inclined to defend the United States 
on this issue. But the Chinese media does manipulate coverage of shootings in 
the United States to maximize their visceral impact. 
Yet against this backdrop of censorship and media distortions, reports in 
Chinese media of police crackdowns on the counterfeiting of trademarked and 
copyrighted goods are frequent, as are journalistic accounts of Chinese 
companies litigating intellectual property disputes in Chinese courts. The 
government does this for some end, but it is not clear that reducing 
counterfeiting is the actual goal. Counterfeit markets operate openly in every 
Chinese city I visited, and students routinely used unauthorized photocopies or 
PDF files in the place of textbooks at every university where I gave lectures. 
My impression is that the CPC is trying to signal internationally that it is 
complying with its treaty obligations, without actually changing the extremely 
profitable counterfeiting culture of China to any substantial degree. Certainly 
some of my students thought that foreign companies were given unfair 
advantages in the Chinese courts, based on news reports that foreign companies 
prevailed in the majority of intellectual property related court cases that resulted 
in verdicts.135 They acknowledged, though, that assertions of disproportionate 
legal success by foreigners could not be verified by a list of cases or by any 
other relevant criteria. Perhaps the news accounts which said that foreigners 
were successfully defending their intellectual property rights in China were 
themselves supposed to motivate future intellectual property law compliance. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the Chinese government is all talk and no 
                                                                                                                       
 135 See Zhao Wen, Foreign Firms Winning Most Infringement Trials, SHANGHAI DAILY, 
Apr. 26, 2012, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/Metro/society/Foreign-firms-winning-most-
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LEXIS NEXIS CHINA LEGAL REV., Mar. 2008, available at http://www.finnegan.com/re 
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Foreign Companies Involved in China IPR Suits, CHINA POST (July 16, 2013), http://www. 
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increase in intellectual property lawsuits involving foreign companies); Brian Safran, 
Challenging the Presumption that China Is Weak on Intellectual Property, ATLANTIC-
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view/Challenging_the_Presumption_that_China_is_Weak_on_Intellectual_Property. 
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action, when it comes to controlling foreign creative works, as will be seen 
below.  
A. Chinese Censorship Affects Film Content Worldwide  
Consider the case of foreign movies. Movies from the United States and 
other nations are actively censored by CPC actors. If particular movies are not 
authorized for distribution by the Chinese government, they cannot be lawfully 
shown in theaters in China, and the only copies that circulate are illegal in a 
criminal law sense as well as unauthorized in a copyright law sense. The 
Chinese government selects only thirty-four foreign films for domestic 
distribution each year.136 The censorship guidelines of China’s State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television include: 
[P]rohibitions against “disturbing social orders and harming the social 
stability,” “violations against the fundamental principle of the Constitution,” 
and “promoting obsceneness, gambling and violence.”  
The rules also forb[id] content such as “murders, violence, horrors, ghosts 
and demons, supernaturalism . . . value orientations confusing the real and the 
fake, the innocent and the evil, and the beautiful and the ugly.”137 
China is a market that can generate $50 million in revenues for a popular 
movie.138 Films that offend the government censors for any reason have no 
chance of being officially distributed in China.139 For this reason producers who 
hope to have films on China’s approved list will engage in substantive edits and 
rewrites to please the CPC censors in Beijing.140 For example: 
When aliens besiege Earth in Universal Pictures’ recent action film 
“Battleship,” it is the Chinese authorities in Hong Kong whom Washington 
credits with delivering the early proof that these invaders aren’t exactly 
homegrown. 
But those aren’t the only Chinese do-gooders on screen these days. 
                                                                                                                       
 136 Mark McDonald, Beijing’s Censors Could Test the Mettle of Iron Man, N.Y. TIMES 
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2013] PRIVACY LAWS AND PRIVACY LEVERS 887 
 
In “Salmon Fishing in the Yemen,” a romantic comedy about building a 
dam in the Mideast, Chinese hydroelectric engineers showed off their know-
how; the original book included no such characters. In Columbia Pictures’ 
disaster movie “2012,” the White House chief of staff extolled the Chinese as 
visionaries after an ark built by the country’s scientists saves civilization. 
In fact, references to the Middle Kingdom are popping up with remarkable 
frequency in movies these days. Some are conspicuously flattering or 
gratuitous additions designed to satisfy Chinese business partners and court 
audiences in the largest moviegoing market outside the U.S. Others, 
filmmakers say, are simply organic reflections of the fact that China is a rising 
political, economic and cultural power. 
Meanwhile, Chinese bad guys are vanishing—literally. Western studios 
are increasingly inclined to excise potentially negative references to China in 
the hope that the films can pass muster with Chinese censors and land one of 
several dozen coveted annual revenue-sharing import quota slots in Chinese 
cinemas. 
MGM, the studio behind the remake of the 1984 movie “Red Dawn,” last 
year digitally altered the invaders attacking the U.S. to make them North 
Koreans instead of Chinese, as originally shot.141 
Even if a foreign film, or one made by foreign entities in partnership with 
Chinese firms, is allowed into distribution, it still may be a specially censored 
version of the work, with the original version accessible only via unauthorized 
means.142 Chinese movie fans may well go to Chinese movie theaters with the 
expectation that they will be viewing an edited-for-China film.143 U.S. movies 
are sometimes very popular with Chinese theatergoers nonetheless.144 
If a foreign film is not one of the approved thirty-four movies, it can only be 
viewed in China as a (probable145) act of copyright infringement, via illegal 
download, or bootleg DVD. While the Chinese government will affirmatively 
keep large numbers of foreign films away from Chinese citizens by refusing to 
allow them into authorized distribution, it is much less likely to take action to 
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 142 See id. 
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limit unauthorized distributions of unauthorized films via the Internet or 
counterfeiting networks.146  
When the government permits their distribution, it may authorize (in a 
copyright sense) uncut copies of foreign films to be purchased legitimately, but 
I could not ascertain whether this actually happens. Authorized movies reap 
income from theatrical release in China, but it is not clear that Chinese 
consumers prefer to purchase legal DVDs or downloads when that is an option, 
assuming it ever is an option.147 This may be related to costs, and possibly also 
convenience if counterfeit DVDs are more easily obtained than legitimate ones, 
which was certainly my impression. In Shanghai counterfeit movie stores were 
common and carts vending counterfeit movies (and books and CDs) could be 
found on almost every street corner. At every university I visited in China 
counterfeit DVDs could be conveniently purchased right on campus. No one I 
asked, and I mean no one, knew where I could go to confidently purchase 
authorized, noninfringing copies of foreign movies. 
 Any preference by Chinese people for bootlegs of officially sanctioned 
movies as against authorized DVDs probably isn’t typically directly linked to 
concerns about intellectual confidentiality or desires to have viewing 
preferences remain private. Once a film earns the approval of the government 
censors it seems unlikely that anyone would be judged negatively for watching 
it. It is possible, however, that someone known to watch only foreign films 
might in some circumstances be accused of lacking patriotism for failing to 
support domestic movies. But that is unlikely to be a serious problem, given the 
popularity of foreign brands of consumer goods in China generally.  
Copyright infringement by consumers in the United States has sometimes 
been linked to a desire for privacy, when the unauthorized downloading or 
viewing of infringing content was mistakenly believed to be private in nature, 
particularly pornography. The U.S. government has almost no interest in 
policing online pornography as long as the performers are adults.148 
Pornographers, however, have created profitable business models based on 
identifying unauthorized downloaders of their pornography, and then suing 
them for copyright infringement.149 Many of the downloaders settle quickly to 
avoid having their names published in association with pornography that may 
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be violent or racist and often is both.150 In China, pornography is illegal but 
informally tolerated.151 As with copyright infringement, one assumes the CPC 
has the tools to enforce the laws but lacks either the courage or the desire to do 
so. 
B. Uploading, Downloading and Piratical Diversions 
“Piracy” as a means to access unapproved foreign films does not seem to 
particularly worry the Chinese government. If it did, there would be a 
crackdown that would also have the salutary effect of demonstrating to 
countries like the United States that it was actively combatting copyright 
infringement. Because piracy tools also facilitate the distribution of 
unauthorized domestic movies and other cultural works that the CPC might 
prefer not to have in circulation, the CPC assuredly employs technical means to 
combat them. It simply chooses not to deploy them on behalf of foreign movie 
producers. One observer has written grandiloquently about the expressive 
empowerment possible through piracy: 
In China’s cultural system that highly controls its information production and 
circulation, piracy not just [sic] provides easier and cheaper access to cultural 
goods, but in most cases, piracy offers the only channel for distributing a great 
amount of cultural works that are otherwise not allowed to be circulated and 
consumed. The Chinese movie audience is denied by China’s tight control 
cultural access not just to Hollywood entertainment limited by the tight quota 
system but also to a large number of independent domestic films that have 
been banned by censorship due to their often challenging political messages 
and alternative cultural contents. Piracy often functions as the only channel 
through which these censored films can be circulated and consumed. As a viral 
distribution circuit that can easily evade censorship, piracy, therefore, 
decentralizes the hegemony of state cultural control and potentially empowers 
those who are denied the right to access, as well as those who are deprived of 
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the freedom to create. And this is piracy’s biggest threat, or promise, in the 
contemporary cultural landscape of China.152 
But it is not clear at all that the observation that piracy “can easily evade 
censorship” is correct.153 Additionally, my impression is that pirated works 
remain below the government radar more effectively in hard copy form than 
online, which would impede the speed and ease of distribution.  
As explained above, the Chinese government uses undisclosed formulae to 
choose which foreign and domestic films will be allowed into theaters and 
authorized circulation. Though some may be rejected because their content is 
viewed as potentially culturally destabilizing, most probably fail to make the cut 
for much more mundane reasons and are not viewed as socially risky. The CPC 
is probably most invested in retaining overall control of commercial film 
distribution and likely pays a lot more attention (both observational and 
interventionist) to individuals who upload films with the intention of 
distributing them, than it does to individual downloaders, especially for 
nonthreatening films.  
The CPC’s efforts to curtail broad distribution of problematic films 
probably include technological tracking and filtering online, and real space 
identification and punishment of transgressors. Downloaders of these movies 
may be somewhat at risk, though not nearly as much as uploaders and hosts. 
Efforts to produce and/or virally distribute civically unacceptable independent 
films, whether foreign or domestic, is probably risky for all concerned, 
especially when attempted online.154  
Governmental monitoring of uploading activity and of web content hosting 
that is driven by political considerations could, and most assuredly would, 
simultaneously address copyright concerns if, like certain political messages, 
copyright infringement was viewed as a threat to social harmony. No dual 
censorship/copyright infringement focus by the CPC is in evidence, however.155 
Just the opposite. Relevant CPC activities seem focused only upon discouraging 
the making of new independent films with anti-government messages, and on 
preventing the distribution of currently existing ones. Downloads of these 
“dangerous” films may be tracked as well, but downloading is a far less 
effective distributional choke point than those offered by uploading and content 
hosting websites. My guess is that only people under official observation for 
                                                                                                                       
 152 Jinying Li, Piracy, Circulation, and Cultural Control in Contemporary China, in 11 
INDIA, RUSSIA, CHINA: COMP. STUD. ON EURASIAN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 99, 100 (Tetsuo 
Mochizuki & Shiho Maeda eds., 2012), available at http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/rp/publi 
cations/no11/11-08_Li.pdf. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Cf. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fake It Till You Make It, 92 FOREIGN 
AFF. 25, 25–26, 28 (2013), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139452/kal-
raustiala-and-christopher-sprigman/fake-it-till-you-make-it. 
 155 Cf. Brzeski, supra note 139. 
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some other reason have their copyright infringing downloads noted in any 
official manner. 
Massive infringing downloads of unauthorized but “safe” foreign movies 
help meet the demand for affordable audiovisual entertainment, and divert 
popular contempt for the vapidity of authorized domestic film offerings.156 The 
Chinese film industry relies on government subsidies for survival, leading one 
commentator to explain that the Chinese “cinema’s position—as both a political 
apparatus and a commodity—is a major problem for film producers, as they are 
faced with the impossible task of balancing profits with ideology.”157 It’s much 
less of a concern for ordinary citizens who have robust unauthorized access to 
foreign films online to distract them. They would appear to have little to fear 
about engaging in “illegal” downloading or streaming activities their 
government has affirmatively chosen not to interfere with. I met many people in 
China with enormous libraries of unauthorized copies of foreign films, and none 
expressed any concern at all about copyright law. 
V. THE APPEARANCE OF CONFLICT MEETS THE APPEARANCE OF FORCE 
In July of 2009, after first demonstrating to the world that the Internet could 
be instantly turned off across vast swathes of its geography (and cellular phone 
service, too!), the PRC began applying preexisting censoring technologies 
colloquially referred to as “The Great Firewall of China” and “The Golden 
Shield” to block domestic access to social networking sites such as Facebook 
and Twitter.158 A journalist writing in the Economist observed:  
[W]ithin China’s borders the Communist Party has systematically put in place 
projects such as the Great Firewall, which keeps out “undesirable” foreign 
websites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and Golden Shield, which 
monitors activities within China. It has also worked closely with trusted 
domestic internet companies such as Baidu (a search engine), Tencent (an 
internet-services portal), Renren (China’s leading clone of Facebook) and Sina, 
                                                                                                                       
 156 See Laikwan Pang, Piracy/Privacy: The Despair of Cinema and Collectivity in 
China, 31 BOUNDARY 2, no. 3, 2004, at 101, 107 (“Today, the majority of China’s film 
companies relies less on the market than on government aid—which ranges from loans and 
financial awards to government mass ticket purchasing—for survival. As a result, the films 
produced have become more and more compliant with the official ideology, which further 
discourages Chinese productions that cater to the tastes and values of the masses.”). But see 
the recent success of one domestic movie. Sophie Lu, In Box Office Hit, American Dream Is 
Still Alive—in a Maturing China, TEA LEAF NATION (June 10, 2013), http://www.tealeaf 
nation.com/2013/06/in-box-office-hit-american-dream-is-still-alive-in-a-maturing-china/. 
 157 Pang, supra note 156, at 108. 
 158 Sascha Segan, Life Behind the Great Firewall of China, PCMAG.COM (June 27, 
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/slideshow/story/266213/life-behind-the-great-firewall-of-
china. 
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an online media company that includes Weibo, a Twitter-like microblogging 
service.159 
Though in many respects China enjoys well-functioning domestic 
substitutes to Western social media platforms (Weibo, QQ, Weixin, Baidu, 
etc.), Chinese people are well aware of what they are missing (Facebook, 
Twitter, Google and others). The technologist who developed the Great Firewall 
is by one account among the most hated men in China.160 When Fang Binxing 
announced his resignation from his post as the president of the Beijing 
University of Posts and Telecommunication as a result of health concerns, 
online comments about his resignation were very hostile.161 
By far, the most popular comments that have been shared by thousands of 
netizens on Weibo (China’s Twitter) are “Wish the illness can defeat you 
ASAP!” and “We are glad that you are gone [for good]!” Like one netizen 无
聊史 cursed: “I hope Fang gets cancer and die [sic] soon.” Another netizen 我
们没有V made a similar wish: “May the illness take his life ASAP. All 
netizens are on the side of the illness. Please, take his life!”162 
China’s “real name” Internet policy clearly prohibits anonymous web use, 
even though it has not been widely enforced. However, as far as I have been 
able to ascertain, there is no statutory law that illegalizes the use of blocked 
                                                                                                                       
 159 China’s Internet: A Giant Cage, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.econom 
ist.com/news/special-report/21574628-internet-was-expected-help-democratise-china-inste 
ad-it-has-enabled; see also Ke Steven Wan, Internet Service Providers’ Vicarious Liability 
Versus Regulation of Copyright Infringement in China, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 375, 
398–99 (“There are two levels of censorship of Internet speech. First, the Chinese 
government controls what its citizens can see by filtering out information flowing through 
the Internet gateway, which connects China with the outside world. Second, because the 
Internet gateway does not prevent access to content already inside a domestic network, the 
Chinese government relies on the cooperation of regional ISPs to filter information that does 
not have to pass through the Internet gateway. The most prevalent forms of Internet filtering 
include Internet Protocol (‘IP’) address blocking and content filtering. IP address blocking 
refers to preventing users from accessing specific IP addresses. This would prohibit users 
from accessing any content on the blocked site whether or not the content is objectionable. 
Content filtering, however, is more finely grained and prohibits users from accessing any 
site containing certain keywords, phrases, or even images. The filtering technology can even 
allow the government to detect the forbidden words or other ‘content’ within the IP packets 
travelling between users’ computers and targeted sites. Since the Chinese government spares 
no effort to regulate the Internet speech, an additional task of deterring copyright 
infringement should not dramatically increase the administrative costs.”). 
 160 Father of the Great Fire Wall Resigns Due to Deteriorating Health, Chinese 
Netizens Wish Him an Early Death, OFFBEAT CHINA (June 27, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://offbeat 
china.com/father-of-the-great-fire-wall-resigns-due-to-deteriorating-health-chinese-netizens-
wish-him-an-early-death. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id.  
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foreign social networking sites. China tries to prevent access to them but does 
not officially forbid it. Recent reports suggest that despite the technological 
blocks in place, hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens and domiciliaries are 
able to access (e.g.) Facebook regularly from inside China, and this author is 
one of them. I do it by using a Virtual Private Network (VPN), which at least in 
theory shields my computer activities from observation by my in-country ISP. 
While it would be nice to think I outsmarted the Chinese censorship machinery, 
VPNs are not exactly cutting edge and I feel confident that the CPC is aware 
they exist, and that they are being widely used within China. The legality of 
using VPNs there is murky, but if they were clearly forbidden, companies 
would not have any mechanism for engaging in what they believe are at least 
somewhat secure online communications, or for accessing blocked international 
pages they value, and they would leave China. For this reason, VPNs are 
tolerated. They may also be compromised, however; the Chinese government 
has a huge appetite for Internet surveillance and for the technological facility to 
spy undetectably. The functional privacy that VPNs actually offer users is 
contested. My own impression is that VPN users have a false sense of security. 
If VPNs are legally banned or it becomes evident that even sophisticated ones 
are easily breachable and often breached, the only semi-secure, semi-free online 
communications channel in China will be lost, and that would have far ranging 
repercussions for the Chinese economy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At present, the CPC is “allowing its citizens to benefit from the social and 
commercial aspects of the Internet, while placing strict limits on its use for 
political activism.”163 Chinese leaders do not consider the Internet an 
unstoppable force for openness and democracy, so it will not be banned or 
restricted into disutility. In fact, quite the contrary: Various government organs 
are trying to harness the power of social networking overtly, by communicating 
with citizens online, and covertly through mechanisms like astroturfing and 
search engine optimization. Meanwhile, macro concerns about political control 
and individual concerns about reputation simultaneously drive widespread 
online monitoring and censorship by the CPC.  
Everyone is aware of the high level of involvement the CPC has with online 
communications. As a result, VPNs are commonly deployed inside China. 
Some Internet users in China push back against it overtly, using the social 
media platforms available to them, while others try to evade monitoring and 
censorship by aggressively using technology or subterfuge or both in 
                                                                                                                       
 163 How Does China Censor the Internet?, supra note 81; cf. Rachel Lu, Could One 
Chinese City Cut a Small Hole in the Great Firewall?, TEA LEAF NATION (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.tealeafnation.com/2013/06/could-one-chinese-city-cut-a-small-hole-in-the-great-
firewall/. 
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combination. None of this is technically illegal but efforts to limit online 
monitoring and filtering are unofficially battled quite effectively by the CPC. 
At the same time, the Chinese government refuses to use its vast 
surveillance and control capabilities in the service of foreign copyright holders. 
This allows foreign entertainment products including books, movies, music and 
television programming to be widely distributed throughout China, even when 
they are officially censored or unauthorized, at low to no cost or risk to Chinese 
citizens. The CPC sees these media materials as opiates of the masses, rather 
than intellectual resources that are likely to spark revolution or dissent, and they 
are tacitly permitted to be consumed in great quantity as well as in relative 
privacy. 
Much of the active governmental surveillance in China is directed at 
promulgating the CPC conception of social harmony. To effectuate this vision, 
only politically uncomfortable communications are sought out for censoring and 
silencing. This is sometimes done openly; other times it is at least detectable, 
and there is also the risk of silent listening. These activities are intended to 
hamper political activism and repress dissent, and they do. But they also prevent 
business entities from having either confidential communications or confidence 
in communications. Their negotiations, contracts, business activities, personal 
ledgers, trade secrets and financial information are constantly exposed to 
government agents. This would be problematic even if all CPC leaders were 
completely honest because business interests are sometimes in conflict with 
those of the government. When the well-documented tendency toward 
corruption of CPC minions is factored in164 and the possibility exists that 
confidential information will be passed along to competitors, the situation 
becomes completely untenable for some ventures, hampering innovation 
generally and particularly repressing the ascension of Shanghai as a world 
financial center.165 
A New York Times reporter has recently observed, “China, the world’s 
second-largest economy after the United States, has a huge influence on the 
world economy so the actions of its central bank are closely watched across the 
globe. But its financial and banking system remains opaque to Chinese and 
foreigners alike.”166 To grow this sector of its economy, China will need to 
simultaneously provide enough transparency for potential investors to have 
basic understanding of how Chinese markets operate, and adequate 
transactional privacy so that the same potential investors feel confident that they 
can keep their proprietary financial information sufficiently confidential. The 
CPC must balance demands for privacy with its longstanding concerns about 
                                                                                                                       
 164 See Chris Buckley, China Answers One Question About Trial: A Date, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/world/asia/chinese-politician-to-stand-
trial-for-corruption.html?_r=0. 
 165 WANG, supra note 43, at 24. 
 166 David Barboza, Credit Warnings Offer World a Peek into China’s Secretive Banks, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/business/global/credit-
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social stability and personal anxieties about status, power and surreptitious 
wealth accumulation. Its successes and failures will be measured by future 
trends in foreign investment as well as by the openness and vibrancy of 
domestic Chinese artistic and political culture.  
  
